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The point of departure for this paper is the observation that new types of contracts now 
seem to emerge in the Norwegian agri-food system. New contractual formats are linked 
to the ongoing restructuring of the Norwegian agri-food system, largely driven by a 
deregulation of the national agricultural policy, and the strengthened position of the 
retailer chains at the cost of farmers and food processors. New contractual formats are 
found at all stages of the vertical production-distribution chain from farm to fork. In 
another working paper (Hegrenes and Borgen, 2005), we have explored and exemplified 
the ongoing changes in the Norwegian agri-food system in more detail.  
The purpose here is to address issues of a more theoretical and conceptual nature. 
There are multiple questions that need further considerations: What do we more 
precisely mean by contracts? Why are contracts considered as an important coordinating 
device in economic analysis? What is the value and further implications of using 
contracts as a unit of analysis? What are the major contractual forms and how can they 
be categorized?  
As argued by Brousseau and Glachant (2002), contracts have proved to be a useful 
conceptual device in economic analysis since it sets focus on elementary social 
structures; i.e. those that regulate coordination at a bilateral level. But despite its 
simplicity as a concept, the contract also opens up for a number of more complex issues 
when integrated as a building stone in a more extensive theoretical framework such as 
among others Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).1 Brousseau and Glachant (2002) 
have summarized the following advantages from using contracts as a unit of analysis in 
the study of organizations and economics:  
 The analysis of contracts allows a re-examination of the exact nature of difficulties 
associated with economic coordination, while deepening our understanding of the 
functioning and the basis of coordination mechanisms. 
                                                 
 1 Brousseau and Glachant (2002 p. 6) claim that contract theory has developed into three 
branches in economics through the last decades; incentive theory, incomplete contract theory 
and the new institutional transaction cost theory. Our focus here is delimited to the last-
mentioned theory.  
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 This approach illuminates the details of various provisions for coordination: routines, 
incentives, the authority principle, means of coercion, conflict resolution etc. As will 
be clarified later, the study of the interplay within these governance mechanisms is 
of particular interest here.  
 Analysis of the origins of contracts illuminates how agents conceptualise the rules 
and decision-making structures that frame their behaviour. 
 Studying the evolution of contractual mechanism helps to understand changes in the 
structures that frame economic activity.  
 
Clearly, a proper understanding of related theory is useful in order to explain the variety 
of contractual mechanisms, and the ways by which they evolve in real life. The relevant 
theory(ies) is (are) those that set contracts as the prime unit of analysis. Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) is an obvious candidate. We will briefly resume the motivation 
for claiming that TCE is a theoretical framework that can enhance our understanding of 
the new contractual forms. Given our empirical interest in this project²changing 
contractual arrangements in the Norwegian agri-food sector²we will pay particular 
attention to the recent theorizing associated with the intermediate governance forms; so-
called hybrid governance structures. This is motivated by the observation that agri-food 
is characterised by a myriad of contractual arrangements ³between market and 
hierarchy´, to follow the standard TCE-terminology. Unfortunately, the vocabulary 
when it comes to hybrid governance is not standardized as yet (Mpnard, 2004a), and 
multiple specific questions remain unsettled. 
As indicated in the title, the paper sets out to clarify how TCE can add to our 
understanding of the emerging contractual formats in the Norwegian agri-food system. 
The first part of chapter 2 gives a brief introduction to the basic explanatory framework 
of TCE. Thereafter follows a review of some recent attempts to conceptualise hybrid 
governance. In chapter 3, focus is set on the agri-food sector. The more specific 
objective is to summarize prevailing investigations of the agri-food system that bear 
some relevance to our discussion of hybrid governance. This includes selected literature 
on vertical integration, as well as attempts to predict the causal mechanisms behind 
various governance forms, basically in a TCE-spirit. But first and foremost this chapter 
refers to a recent empirical attempt to classify hybrid governance in agri-foods 
(Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2002). The classification in question is empirically 
grounded in a large number of agri-food cases that can all be characterised as special 
types of hybrid governance. Finally (chapter 4), we summarize our answer to the overall 
question of the paper: How can TCE in general²and in particular the theorising on 
hybrid governance as it stands today²contribute to explore the new contractual formats 
in the Norwegian agri-food system? This final chapter serves as a critical discussion of 
the potential benefits of applying this line of thought to the empirical reality of the 
Norwegian agri-food system, but will also shed light on the blind spots and weaknesses 
of the theory as it stands today. 
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To gain a deeper understanding of the nature of contracts²and the dynamics of 
evolving contractual arrangements²we need to address theories into which contracts 
play a fundamental role. The contract should be the major unit of analysis and play a 
fundamental role in the explanatory framework that constitutes the core of the theory.  
There are several such theories to select from in the scholarly literature within 
economics, organization theory and institutional analysis. One is the so-called complete 
contract theory. A complete contract is defined as one that is signed taking all variables 
into account that are or can be pertinent and that are enough to completely coordinate 
the agents (references). In this explanatory framework, the uncertainty of the future is 
reduced to elements coming from a predetermined and²per definition²an exhaustive 
list. Interaction between the parties lasts only for one period. Once signed, the contract 
will never have to be revised. None of such assumptions are acceptable in our case since 
the research problems are indirectly assumed to be non-existent. It is the very existence 
of uncertainty²the fact that the involved parties don¶t have all information available at 
the time of contracting²that makes complete contracts an unattainable scenario.  
Given our ambition to analyse the evolving contractual arrangements of the agri-food 
system, it is more relevant to turn to the way contracts are conceptualised within 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). As shall be explained repeatedly throughout the 
paper, we consider TCE as a relevant framework to explain the changing structure of 
the Norwegian agri-food system. However, there are multiple problems to take into 
account. TCE is clearly not a theory that can give a ³complete´ description or 
explanation of anything. A part of our ambition here is therefore to address some of the 
major ³blind spots´ and weaknesses of the theory as it stands today. More specifically, 
we concentrate on the scholarly discussion centred around the so-called hybrid 
governance forms; i.e. the intermediate governance forms with elements of both 
markets and hierarchy. Clearly, this is what we usually find in the real world; 
everything else is pure theory. We will review the relevant literature with a bent towards 
their potential to illuminate our empirical field, which is the agri-food system in general, 
and the Norwegian agri-food system in particular.  
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Indeed, the contract is perceived of as fundamental unit of analysis in TCE. Williamson 
(2002) draws a distinction between the ³science of choice´ and the ³science of 
contract´. The former refers to neoclassical economics, and its refined optimisation 
apparatus. Williamson conceives of the ³obsession´ with choices in this influential line 
of thought as a deception. This is not a new critique. As argued by the old institu-
tionalist John Commons (e.g. Commons, 1931, 1932), the ultimate unit of analysis in 
economics should contain the three principles of (1) conflict of interest, (2) mutual 
dependence, and (3) order.2 Williamson holds that the contract lives up to these 
demands better than does the act of choice. Involved here is a more general critique of 
neoclassical theory, and in particular its emphasis on how the price system coordinates 
the use of resources, to the neglect of the inner workings of real firms and the related 
theory of the firm as a governance structure.  
But what do we more precisely mean by contract, and why has this concept 
developed a prominent position in economic theory the last decades? A contract is in 
economic theory normally conceived of as an agreement under which two parties make 
reciprocal commitments in terms of their behaviour. It is simply perceived of as a 
bilateral coordination arrangement (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002). This interpretation 
clearly touches on the legal concept of the contract, but also transcends it since it is 
explicitly linked to a wider²and varied²body of economic theory. Over the past thirty 
years, the ´contract´ has become a central notion in economic analysis. Under the 
umbrella term ³new institutional economics´ (NIE), the following branches can be 
identified (Mpnard, 2004b): Transaction costs economics focus mostly on explaining 
the existence and properties of alternative modes of organization and the trade-off 
among them. Agency theory primarily examines incentives; i.e. the way a principal can 
induce agent to behave according to his interest. The property rights paradigm²old or 
new² centres on ownership and the related allocation of decision rights as a 
determinant for understanding relationship-specific investments. The contract plays a 
significant role in all branches.  
Following Brousseau and Glachant (2002 p. 4) these disciplines²which have in 
common the fact that contract is assigned a fundamental role as unit of analysis²have 
developed from a dissatisfaction vis-a-vis Walrasian market theory. New analytical 
tools have been sought to explain how economic agents determine the properties, 
quantities and prices of the resources they trade in face-to-face encounters. If these 
agents are subject to transaction costs, if they can benefit from informational 
advantages, or if there are situations in which irreversible investments must be made, 
then it is reasonable to expect that one will not see the same goods traded at the same 
price and under the same rules as on a Walrasian market. Following in the footsteps of 
Smith and Walras, neoclassical economists long based their analysis of the functioning 
of decentralized economies on the notions of market and price system. As first argued 
by Coase (1937, 2002), this application of Walrasian analysis, in which supply meets 
demand around a posted price, does not however, satisfactorily account for the 
characteristics of a decentralized economy. In particular, TCE has contested the 
neoclassical dogma that scarce resources are allocated by means of the price mechanism 
only. Neoclassical economics is further criticised for overemphasising the significance 
of its favourite themes like marginalism (³choices made at the margin´), equilibrium 
and optimisation. As observed by Simon (1978 p. 6):  
                                                 
 2 ³I start with scarcity, like all economists, as universal for all economic theory, and then I 
proceed, as did Hume, to show that out of scarcity proceeds not only conflict, but also the 
collective action that sets up order on account of mutual dependence.´ (Commons, 1932 p. 
266). 
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³As economics expands beyond its central core of price theory and its central 
concern with quantities of commodities and money, we observe in it «[a] shift 
from a highly quantitative analysis, in which equilibrium at the margin plays a 
central role, to a much more qualitative institutional analysis, in which discrete 
structural alternatives are compared´ (as cited in Williamson, 1991). 
 
Neoclassical economic theory is predominantly occupied with abstract conceptuali-
sations of markets, whereas much economic activity evidently takes place within firms. 
But if markets are so superior as claimed by neoclassical theory, why do we have firms? 
Ronald Coase was the first scholar to conclude convincingly that the boundaries of the 
firm depends not only on its productive technology and the relative prices of its 
production resources, but also on the costs of contracting business. Coase¶s seminal 
article ³The Nature of the Firm´ (1937) has contributed substantially to reinterpret and 
transform economic theory, and have through the last decades triggered multiple new 
questions that have earlier been ignored. Coase¶s imperative was to ³study the firm as it 
is´, i.e. to challenge the black-box-assumptions of neoclassical theory. The neoclassical 
interpretation of the firm as a production function should make way for the view of the 
firm as a governance structure.  
Coase¶s point of departure is that resources are allocated by two different insti-
tutions: markets and firms. The very presence of the firm implies that the price 
mechanism had somehow failed. Had it not, firms should not have emerged at all. He 
thereby contests the general and influential idea set forth by the classical theorist Adam 
Smith that market is the default form of economic exchange. This is not true by any 
necessity, and the clue is rather to clarify under what conditions markets have pre-
eminence over other modes of governance. According to Coase, market failure should 
be attributed to the fact that allocating resources through the market costs something. 
The replacement of the market through the authority of the firm helps to reduce the 
costs of using the price mechanism (³marketing costs´). The firm exists because²under 
certain conditions²it is a more efficient mean of resource allocation and decision 
coordination than the price mechanism. The costs of contracting is reduced if a factor of 
production (read: entrepreneur) don¶t have to enter a series of contracts with other 
factors of production, but rather replace a series of smaller contracts with one long-term 
contract. The emergent relationship is defined by Coase as the firm. Since Coase opened 
this new door, TCE has been more and more refined. It has gradually been applied to 
analyze such diverse phenomena as outsourcing, vertical integration, long-term 
contracting, foreign market entry strategy, sales force control and compensation issues, 
changes of property rights and regulatory regimes (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  
The underlying explanatory framework of TCE as it stands today has a uniform core. 
The general claim is that organizations are structured to minimize production and 
transaction costs (though the theory pay only lip-service to the former). The credo is 
that different governance forms (market, hierarchy, hybrid) evolve in order to minimize 
transaction costs. The dependent variable is the continuum from the ³pure´ market 
through various intermediate hybrid forms (partnerships, joint ventures, cooperatives 
etc.) to the ³pure´ hierarchy. TCE sets out to explain the relative performance of the 
market, hierarchy and hybrid. More specifically, if the circumstances of a particular 
transaction change (either the inherent properties of the transaction or the nature of the 
transaction climate or both), an adjustment of the transactions and the governance form 
is expected to follow. The switch-mechanism by which one governance form is 
expected to replace another is of a cost-benefit type. In principle, if a cost-benefit 
analysis of transactions is in favour of markets in a specific setting, the market is 
predicted to emerge. TCE can be outlined as in a simplified causal model (cf. Figure 
2.1). Relative performance of various governance forms is a function of transaction 
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costs which are a function of transaction specific investments, behavioural uncertainties, 
environmental uncertainty, and frequency. These factors constitute the essence of the 
transactional nature of the activities that needs to be organized.  
 
 
Transaction-specific 
investments   
 
Behavioral 
uncertainty        Relative performance of 
(opportunism, bounded  Transaction costs  various governance 
rationality)         forms (market, 
    hierarchy, hybrid)                
Environmental 
uncertainty 
 
Frequency 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The basic explanatory framework of TCE  
 
From the perspective of TCE, a relevant issue to explore is whether there are any 
dependencies between the transactors. If dependencies exist between them, a need will 
follow to safeguard their economic interest, which further implies transaction costs (i.e. 
costs that are associated with necessary control and monitoring activities). TCE further 
suggests what can be the sources of these dependencies between the transactors; i.e. 
various kinds of uncertainty, various types of specificity, or the fact that ³few numbers´ 
are involved (such as monopoly and oligopoly). Furthermore, the rationale inherent in 
TCE is that performance depends on the fitness of the mode of governance to the 
attributes of the transaction. The outcome of this fitness is that total transaction costs are 
minimized (cf. Figure 2.2). This implies that simple transactions can be managed by a 
simple governance structure, whereas complex transactions call for more complex 
governance structures.  
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(a) Estimate m agnitude of 
transaction costs;   
-asset specificity of transactions
-uncertainty of transactions 
-frequency of transactions 
(b) M ap governance set-up 
(structure/mechanism s)  
- incentive intensity 
- adaptation mechanism
- contracts
Core issue in TCE-analysis:  Does (b) 
m inimize (a)?
 
Figure 2.2 The core questions addressed by TCE 
 
The variety of ways of organizing transactions reflects the fact that transactions differ in 
some basic attributes. Milgrom and Roberts (1992 p.30) identify five kinds of trans-
action attributes: 
 the specificity of the investments required to conduct the transaction 
 the frequency with which similar transactions occur and the duration of period of 
time over which they are repeated 
 the complexity of transaction and the uncertainty about what performance will be 
required 
 the difficulty of measuring the transaction 
 the connectedness of the transaction to the other transactions involving other people. 
 
An investment is transaction specific if it would lose much of its value outside the 
specific use it is initially intended for.3 Transaction specificity is closely associated with 
mutual dependency between the parties. Transactions that require specific investments 
also require a contract to protect the investor against early termination of or opportu-
nistic renegotiation of the terms of production relationship. If one of the parties finds 
himself in a ³lock-in´ situation, he runs the risk of being subject to opportunistic 
behaviour from the other party; i.e. a so-called hold-up. The hold-up problem can be 
described as the problem in which each party worries about being forced to accept 
disadvantageous terms later, after it has sunk an investment, or worries that its invest-
ment may be devalued by the actions of others. The significance and consequences of 
this problem will depend on the degree of asset specificity and opportunistic behaviour.  
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the frequency of the transactions in 
question²and more indirectly their degree of programmability²will significantly 
influence the organization structure. One-time affairs call for another governance 
structure than frequent transactions. In the first case they can be expected to use 
available general mechanisms, for instance to resort to the court to resolve any disputes. 
The general contract law is the major instrument to settle conflicts. In case of parties 
                                                 
 3 The description of the attributes is a summary of Milgrom and Roberts (1992 p.30±33).  
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who interact frequently, one would expect another mechanism to settle disputes. They 
rarely resolve conflicts in courtrooms. Arbitration is a well-known instrument.  
The complexity of the governance structure (including the contracting process) will 
also be dependent on the degree of uncertainty associated with the transactions in 
question. Clearly, uncertainty has many facets and sources, and focus must clearly be 
set on the types of uncertainties that are most relevant and consequential for the 
transactions in question. In an empirical study of vertical integration, Sutcliffe and 
Zaheer (1998) made a distinction between three sources of uncertainty; i.e. primary, 
competitive and supplier-based. The last-mentioned source is directly related to the risk 
of opportunistic behaviour from suppliers. Not surprisingly, this source appeared in 
their empirical study to be the most significant driver towards vertical integration. 
Generally, the more complex the transaction is and the more uncertainties there are 
about the required performance, the more difficult and complex the contracting process 
will be. If it is difficult to specify and measure performance, the contracts will typically 
specify rights, obligations, and procedures rather than actual performance. Even when 
the desired performance is perfectly predictable, it might be difficult or costly to 
measure performance. The ³solution´ is often to rearrange the affairs to make measure-
ment easier or to reduce the importance of accurate measurement.  
Transactions also differ with respect to the degree of interconnectedness to other 
transactions. Some transactions are largely independent of all others. Other decisions 
are much more interdependent. One way to respond to close connectedness is to 
strengthen central coordination mechanisms.  
Transaction Cost Economics assumes that agents are boundedly rational and behave 
opportunistically. Bounded rationality means that there are inherent limitations on 
human mental abilities that prevent people from foreseeing all possible contingencies 
and calculating their optimal behaviour. It may also include those limitations on human 
language that prevent perfect communication of those things that are known. 
Opportunistic behaviour means self-interested behaviour unconstrained by morality. An 
opportunist is a person who takes advantage of any opportunity to achieve an end, often 
with no regard for principles and consequences. Opportunism and trust are two opposite 
sides of a coin. A trustworthy person is a person who is capable of being dependent 
upon, in situations where behaviour and outcome cannot be perfectly controlled. 
 
It should be clear by now, that contracts play a fundamental role within TCE. Indeed, 
one important achievement in this theory is the development of a typology of contracts; 
i.e. generic modes of contracting that all represent a coherent match between the nature 
of the underlying transactional characteristics and the contract type. These modes are 
commonly referred to as classical contracting, neoclassical contracting, hierarchical 
contracts and relational contracts, drawing on the typology developed by Macneil 
(1974).  
 
Classical contract law is congruent with and supports the autonomous market form of 
organization. A classical contract is characteristic of market relationships, with prices of 
assets involved as the determinant, whereas specificity and contractual safeguards are 
very low or null. Transactions within the framework of classical contracting are ³sharp 
in by clear agreement, sharp out by clear performance´ (Macneil, 1974 p. 738). In other 
words, these transactions are completely specified ex ante. Adaptation beyond the 
explicit terms of the contract is not expected. The identity of the parties is irrelevant. 
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Classical contracts are monetized in extreme degree. Contract law is interpreted in a 
very legalistic way, which implies that more formal terms (e.g. written agreements) 
supersede oral amendments another less formal features. Typically, it implies hard 
bargaining, to which the rules of contract law are strictly applied.  
 
Neoclassical contract law applies to contracts in which the parties to the transaction 
maintain their autonomy but are nevertheless bilaterally dependent. These types of 
contracts are ³agreements in principle´, including tacit as well as explicit arrangements. 
A neoclassical contract is typically a long-term arrangement, in order to develop a 
continuing relationship. The identity of parties does matter, since bilateral dependency 
is non-trivial. Adaptation mechanism must be elastic enough to enable parties to adjust 
to consequential disturbances. The parties to such contracts maintain autonomy, but the 
contract is mediated by an elastic contracting mechanism. Long-term, incomplete 
contracts require special adaptive mechanisms to effect realignment and restore 
efficiency when exposed to unanticipated disturbances. Neoclassical contract refers 
disputes to arbitration rather than the courts.  
 
Hierarchy (also called internal organization and unilateral contract regime) is a still 
more elastic and adaptive mode of organization. A distinguishing feature of internal 
organization is that bilateral adaptation is effected through fiat. Following Williamson 
(1991), the implicit contract law of internal organization is forbearance. Hierarchy acts 
as ³its own court of ultimate appeal´. For obvious reasons, courts refuse to hear disputes 
for instance between one internal division of a company and another. The parties in a 
firm must for the greater part resolve their differences internally. Prices play a relatively 
small role in internal adjustments while asset specificity and contractual safeguards 
have high values. In these contractual arrangements, adaptability to highly conse-
quential disturbances is crucial, while highly specific assets create risks of opportunism 
that detailed safeguards are built in to reduce. 
 
A relational contract is ³[a@ contract that specifies only the general terms and objectives 
and specifies mechanisms for decision making and dispute resolution´ (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992 p. 602). Such contracts are typically more flexible than classical and neo-
classical contracts. Unilateral contracts are usually of a relational type. Relational 
contracts are common for internal governance, but also for some form of hybrid govern-
ance types, as we shall explore further in subchapter 3. One special case of relational 
contract appears to be more and more common in agri-food; i.e. a relatively general 
contractual framework combined with reference(s) to public quality standards, in some 
instances also to company-specific, private standards. As the number and significance 
of such quality standards evolve at all levels of the food supply chains, it is reasonable 
to assume that their role as points of references for long-lasting contractual arrange-
ments will increase. To the extent that the standards cover the essential aspects of 
parties` interaction, the issues to remaining issues to determine may be relatively few. 
Clearly, we would expect more of this ³framework  reference´-contractual formats in 
long-lasting interaction which is typically (but not necessarily) characterized by 
emerging mutual dependencies, capability to minimize various types of transactional 
uncertainties, as well as frequent interaction.  
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Somewhat ironically, the notion ³transaction costs´ is far from clear-cut, or rather, it 
appears as a generalized concept that covers a wide range of sub-types. To avoid an 
inflation of different more or less relevant subtypes, it is an obvious need to classify 
them in a structured manner. Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) have categorised transaction 
costs according to their sources and types. They make a distinction between three 
sources of transaction costs; safeguarding, adaptation, and performance evaluation. The 
first one, safeguarding, is associated with asset specificity. The second one, adaptation, 
is related to environmental uncertainty. The third type, performance evaluation, is 
predominantly linked to behavioural uncertainty. Moreover, Rindfleisch and Heide 
(op.cit.) draw a distinction between two types of transaction costs; direct costs and 
opportunity costs. The latter is important since an omitted benefit is also a cost. Taken 
together, these distinctions amount to a matrix consisting of six different subtypes of 
transaction costs: (1) costs of crafting safeguards; (2) failure to invest in productive 
assets; (3) communication, negotiation and coordination costs; (4) maladaptation; (5) 
screening and selection; measurement costs; and finally (6) failure to identify 
appropriate partners; plus productivity losses through effort adjustment (cf. Figure 2.3).  
 
Screening and
selection (ex ante)
Measurement costs
(ex post) 
Communication,
negotiation and
coordination costs 
Costs of crafting 
safeguards 
- Direct costs 
Failure to identify 
appropriate partners 
(ex ante).
Productivity losses
through effort 
adjustment (ex post)
Maladaptation:
failure to adapt
Failure to invest in
productive assets
- Opportunity costs 
B. Types of 
transaction costs  
Performance 
evaluation 
Adaptation Safeguarding A. Sources of 
transaction costs 
Behavioural 
uncertainty 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
Asset specificity 
 
Figure 2.3 Sources and types of transaction costs  
 
Clearly, not all subtypes are equally relevant, and the three subtypes of direct 
transaction costs are most commonly referred to in empirically based TCE-based 
studies. However, for the sake of a complete analysis, it is worthwhile to have in mind 
that transaction costs are also associated with decisions that are bluntly wrong (e.g. 
selecting wrong contractual partner) or myopic (pursuing a strategy that creates more 
problems than it solves).  
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As already mentioned, one important insight from Transaction Cost Economics is that 
economic analysis should not be limited to decision processes at spot markets only (i.e. 
decisions of autonomous buyers and sellers), but also include decision processes within 
firms or hierarchies (³internal decisions´). A further insight is that markets and 
hierarchies are merely two ³pure´ (ideal-typical) forms of governance. What we find in 
real-life, are a myriad of diverse blends of governance instruments, where various kinds 
of contractual arrangements are constitutive components. Doubtless, the awareness of 
the importance of such intermediary forms has been growing among scholars through 
the last decades (Klein and Shelanski, 1996). One of the major contributors to the 
development of TCE, Oliver Williamson, has stated that (Williamson, 1991):  
³Whereas I was earlier of the view that transactions of the middle kind 
[between market and hierarchy] were very difficult to organise, and hence very 
unstable, on which account the bimodal distribution was more accurately 
descriptive, I am now persuaded that transactions in the middle range are much 
more common. The uniform distribution appears most nearly to correspond with 
the world of contract as it is.´ (as cited in Affuso (1990) after Williamson [1985 
pp. 83±84@.  
 
Notwithstanding the increased interest, there are many unsettled questions. There are 
multiple theoretical and empirical contributions in the scholarly literature, but at this 
stage, they have not successfully converged on a common vocabulary. As underlined by 
Brousseau (1995), hybrid governance appears to be defined either axiomatically or in a 
descriptive manner. Williamson¶s (1991) definition²that the hybrid form is an 
intermediate form between market and hierarchy²exemplifies the former type. 
Notwithstanding its fruitfulness and capability to add to our understanding of the 
dynamics of governance mechanism at micro level, this axiomatic approach is still 
incomplete and insufficient. The problem is that this definition does not clarify in any 
detail the nature and characteristics of hybrid governance beyond the obvious fact that 
hybrids are positioned somewhere between ³pure´ markets and hierarchies. So what? 
That is where the greater part of organizational forms is positioned. There are many 
questions to address, some of which are of a fundamental nature: What are the more 
precise characteristics of a hybrid form? Is it a stable or a transient type of governance? 
Given that a specific governance structure has elements of both market and hierarchy, 
what determines the concrete mixture in a specific context? What are the design 
parameters that determine the structure and core processes of a specific hybrid form? 
Under what conditions can hybrid forms be expected to emerge and retained? What are 
the (dis)advantages of specific hybrid forms as compared to pure markets and the pure 
hierarchies, respectively?  
It is somewhat ironic that there is so much valid knowledge available about pure and 
abstract governance forms that are never found in practice, but limited knowledge about 
the forms that are observed in real life. As argued by Coase (1988), the problem is no 
longer to identify the properties of the market and of the hierarchy, but to analyze the 
differences among the multiple types of coordination modes, which are most often of a 
hybrid nature. An important analytical challenge is to develop an analytical framework 
by which various modes of hybrid organizations can be compared in a structured and 
informative manner. Furthermore, one should clarify the conditions under which 
various coordination forms are most likely to work efficiently. This subchapter is 
devoted to a review of selected literature on hybrid governance, with the purpose of 
emphasising the issues that contribute the most to our understanding of hybrid 
governance forms in the agri-food system. Not by accident, we start with some 
relatively general contributions, and end up with an empirically grounded typology that 
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are of practical use for our empirical study of new contractual arrangements in the 
Norwegian agri-food sector.  
The first conceptual and methodological point to take into account when studying 
hybrid governance, is to draw a distinction between governance forms and governance 
mechanisms. Market exemplifies the former, and prices exemplify the latter. This 
distinction is a key to understand the flexibility of hybrid forms, since it emphasises the 
potential for combining governance instruments into governance forms. Metaphorically 
speaking; the fact that there is blood in all animals, does not mean that all animals are 
alike. From this basis, a principal distinction between four types of generic coordination 
mechanisms may be developed. Pihl (2000) is one of several students of organizations 
who have developed a classification according to this line of thought. This type of 
classification also sets focus on the respective conditions under which the coordination 
mechanisms work effectively. This is related both to the parameters that TCE enrols in 
its explanatory framework, but also some other variables. The essence of his classifi-
cation can be visualized as follows:  
 
,GHRORJ\ ´KDQGVKDNH´
Focus: Actor`s system of beliefs and perceptions  
+  Master complexity and fast changes 
+ Enhance motivation  
5XOHV ´KDQGERRN´
Focus: Explisite, formalized restrictions and
instructions   
+ Master situations that can be analyzed in beforehand
+ Secure equal task execution in different parts and at
various times  
+ Secure expected quality in processes and products   
$XWKRULW\ ´YLVLEOH
KDQG´
Focus: Positions that 
are ranked: higher
order level commands 
lower level. 
+ Obtain economies of 
scale in information 
processing, contracts, 
design and control 
+ Master team-work
and transactionspecific 
investments 
+ Protect and disperse
specific knowledge  
+ Facilitate ´radical 
changes´ 
3ULFH ´LQYLVLEOH
KDQG´
Focus: Exchange
between autonomous 
actors  
+ Develop strong 
incentives  
+ Development based 
on dispersed, specific 
knowledge  
+ Allocate demand
from various sources 
 
Figure 2.4 Coordination mechanisms 
 
There are many ramifications of this distinction for the theoretical and empirical study 
of hybrid governance. First of all, it helps to increase the awareness of the combinatorial 
potential and flexibility that is inherent in organizations. In principle, there are 
numerous ways of combining the building stones in questions (read: price, authority, 
rules and ideology). The relevant issue to explore empirically is why a specific mix has 
evolved and found its form over time. If we can assume that many various blends of 
governance mechanisms²in principle²may solve a specific organization problem4, 
how come that one specific solution is selected and retained? This calls for a closer 
                                                 
 4 The notion of equifinality may be applied here; i.e. the conditions in which different initial 
conditions lead to similar effects. 
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investigation of the specific empirical reality that underlie a governance form, including 
its inner dynamics over time and its institutional context. 
Notwithstanding the usefulness of the distinction between governance forms and 
governance mechanisms, the risk emerges that the flexibility is exaggerated and the 
complexity explodes. Hybrid governance is not a question of friction-free combinations 
of governance mechanisms. There are organizing principles to take into account, more 
or less specified in the literature as per now. The theme is evolving, and there are 
contributions available that suggest a further structure of hybrid governance forms. We 
shall here concentrate on three contributions that appears to be well structured and 
illuminating; i.e. Hennart, Brousseau and Mpnard. They differ significantly, but are all 
based on the idea that governance forms should follow from the transactional character-
istics that underlie the activities subject to organizing.  
 
Hennart (1993) has developed a model that sets out to explain the emergence of hybrid 
forms, based on a comparative analysis of selected transaction costs; i.e. the costs of 
cheating and shirking. At the outset, Hennart formulates some propositions that lay the 
foundation for the study of hybrid governance:  
1. As already mentioned, one must distinguish between methods of organizing (the 
price system and hierarchy) and economic institutions (markets and firms). 
There is no one-to-one correspondence between the two, and any given 
institution may, under specific circumstances, use a mix of both methods of 
organization.  
2. The two organizing methods²the price system and the hierarchy²use different 
techniques to organize economic activities. The price system rewards agents on 
the basis of their outputs; hierarchy rewards on the basis of behavior (inputs). In 
a world of zero transaction costs, both would be equally effective (Coase, 1937). 
With positive organizing costs, each technique will experience divergent levels 
of organizing costs for a given transaction. 
3. The cost of using price constraints (cheating costs) is the cost of measuring 
output plus the losses due to fraud when measurement is imperfect. The cost of 
using hierarchy is that of using behaviour constraints. This cost, which can be 
called ³shirking cost´ is the sum of the cost of constraining behavior plus the 
residual amount of shirking due to imperfect behavior constraints. 
4. Price constraints minimize shirking but encourage cheating; behaviour 
constraints minimize cheating but encourage shirking. The choice between using 
prices and hierarchy will depend on the relative costs of measuring output plus 
that of tolerating the residual amount of cheating as compared to those of 
constraining behavior and bearing the residual amount of shirking.  
5. Markets are institutions that predominantly use the price method of organizing. 
Firms predominantly rely on hierarchy. However, because of diminishing 
returns to measuring output and constraining behaviour, both firms and markets 
will often use a mix of price and behaviour constraints. The firm¶s mix will 
contain a high proportion of behaviour relative to price constraints, the mix in 
markets will be biased towards price constraints.  
6. The combination of price and behaviour constraints defines a wide variety of 
institutional forms along a continuum which goes from pure spot markets to 
traditional firms. The model explains why the most common institutional forms 
use both methods of organizing.  
 
Hennart¶s theory is particularly oriented towards the enforcement properties of prices 
and hierarchy. Hierarchy controls individuals directly by constraining their behaviour 
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(by imposing behaviour constraints) while prices do it indirectly by measuring their 
behaviour (through price constraints). Under hierarchy, individuals receive a salary to 
³do as told´, while self-employed individuals governed by the price system are 
rewarded on the basis of their output. Each system has its own biases: using prices 
maximize efforts, (read: minimizes shirking) but incites individuals to inflate the price 
and/or reduce the quality of their output (read: encourages cheating). Relying on 
hierarchy results in the opposite bias: under hierarchy individuals are not paid in 
function of their output, but instead are rewarded for following directives. They 
therefore have strong incentives to minimize efforts (to shirk) unless properly super-
vised, but being paid a fixed sum of money to follow orders, they have few incentives to 
cheat. Hence, the price system experiences low shirking, but potentially high cheating 
costs, while hierarchy faces low cheating but high shirking costs.  
Then, organizing costs are the sum of shirking and cheating costs. What is clear from 
this study is that most coordination mechanisms have elements/components that 
resemble the market (such as prices, involvements of limited duration) as well as 
components that resemble hierarchies (such as specialized supervision processes, 
delegation of authority etc.).  
Any given transaction will be organized by the mix of price and hierarchy (i.e. by the 
mix of price and behaviour constraints) that minimizes organizing costs. The prediction 
is that a transaction will be organized within a firm if the reduction in cheating costs 
(achieved by replacing price constraints by behaviour constraints) exceeds the resulting 
increase in shirking costs. In the opposite case, a transaction is expected to be organized 
by the market. 
 
Another interesting contribution that can enhance our understanding of hybrid 
governance is developed by Broussesau (1995). He has developed a ³morphological 
grammar´ intended to describe any type of contract between two types of agents. A 
contract is defined as an arrangement between two parties about what each of them shall 
do to realize value through their relationship. Contracts are designed to regulate spot 
exchanges as well as long-term interactions. In a world of bounded rationality and 
information failures, contracts are assumed to have three essential functions:  
1. To enable contractors to coordinate their actions successfully: Since the future 
is uncertain and human rationality is ³bounded´, economic agents do not 
undertake systematically compatible actions. Disequilibrium costs can be 
economized when some types of mechanism are designed to establish for each 
party the actions that collectively generate a desirable output.  
2. To ensure the enforcement of promises: The value of a transaction is inherently 
uncertain. Between any agreement to enter into an exchange and the fulfilment 
of it, intentional or accidental events might arise to threaten its completion. For 
this reason coordination devices include a ³guarantor function´ able to require 
restitution of losses to the remaining party in case of defection by the other.  
3. To share the quasi-rent: When compatibility is ensured and when promises are 
enforced, a quasi-composite rent is generated. The third function of contracts is 
to share this quasi-rent among the participants.  
 
Brousseau underlines that these three categories are present in any type of contracts. His 
further assumption is that any kind of coordination process can be described with a 
limited number of items or ³clauses´ that define each of these mechanisms in more 
detail. He claims that there are only a few mutually exclusive options to design each 
mechanism. Each clause can only take a finite number of states, each of which 
corresponds to a possible mechanism design. For instance, supervision can be operated 
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by each party, a generic mechanism like the court, or a specialized supervisor who can 
be either one of the parties or a third party. When they design a contract, economic 
agents can adopt three alternative solutions in order to ensure technical coordination:  
 to define routines (the way of using assets is fixed ex ante and there is no means of 
redesigning it during the contract) 
 to implement a centralized authority mechanism (one of the agents has the 
discretionary right to redefine the use of the resources involved in the transactions) 
 to design a decentralized authority mechanism; the contractors can bargain to re-
define the use of the resources involved in the transaction.  
 
This reasoning has a strong resemblance to the distinction referred to above between the 
authority mechanism and governance mechanism. One of Brousseau¶s contribution is 
that these options must be explicitly linked to the nature of the underlying transactional 
characteristics. Clearly, Pihl, Hennart and Brousseau (and others could be referred to 
also) all help to enhance our understanding of hybrid governance. As per now, however, 
the reflections presented by Mpnard (2004a) appear to be the scholarly contribution that 
most thoroughly addresses the determinants, dynamics and structure of hybrid 
governance forms. We will therefore pay particular attention to his reasoning on the 
nature of hybrid governance.  
 
Mpnard¶s point of departure is the observation that there exists a great variety of 
agreements among legally autonomous entities that do business together in a particular 
manner: They mutually adjust with little help from the price system, and they share or 
exchange technologies, capital, products and services, but still without a unified 
ownership. A wide range of examples is found in the real world; such as cooperatives, 
subcontracting, networks, franchising and collective trademarks. The intriguing research 
question is, as already mentioned, when a hybrid organization is chosen, what 
determines the choice of a specific form among all the various possibilities? Further, 
what determines the internal properties of these arrangements? What are the major 
drivers of transaction costs? Which elements of the underlying transactional pattern are 
most relevant as we search for an in-depth understanding of new organizational 
patterns? To clarify, Mpnard follows the ³standard´ TCE-framework and pay particular 
attention to the significance of specificity (i.e. mutual dependence) and uncertainty.  
Through the last decades, TCE-based research seems to have converged on the 
assumption that transaction costs are predominantly driven by transaction uncertainty, 
transaction specificity and transaction frequency. But are they necessarily equally 
important, or should they be internally ranked in some way or other with respect to their 
significance? In his discussion of hybrid governance, Mpnard (2004) suggests that 
specificity should have superiority as compared to uncertainty and frequency when 
assessing the relative importance of various determinants:  
³Uncertainty is secondary to the existence of specific investments in that 
without at least a minimal degree of mutual dependence in assets, there would be 
no hybrid arrangements properly speaking´ (Mpnard, 2004a p. 13).  
 
Hence, he considers the primary source of transaction cost in hybrid governance forms 
to be the degree of mutual dependence, which is essentially another name for 
transaction specificity.  
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Multiple empirical tests have confirmed the role of asset specificity (and thereby 
dependency) as a key factor in the trade-off among different modes of organizations; i.e. 
the decisions to organize transactions through markets, within firms or by interfirm 
agreements. Mpnard prefers another focus since he sets out to examine how investment 
decisions that purposely creates a significant degree of mutual dependence between the 
involved players help to understand what governance will be chosen for monitoring the 
arrangement in question. Thereby, he wants to understate that a fundamental issue for 
partners choosing to organize transactions in a hybrid form is their commitment to make 
investments that create significant and durable mutual dependence, but still letting 
property rights and decision-making distinct. Here too, the cooperative organization is 
an illustrative special case since members in such organizations voluntarily give up 
some of their autonomy in order to establish and control (in the case of a sales 
cooperative) a secure outlet for their products. There are obviously multiple other 
organizations that encompasses the same basic characteristics. As Mpnard develops this 
reasoning further in accordance with the TCE-framework, he suggests the following 
proposition: 
³The more specific mutual investments are, the higher are the risks of 
opportunistic behaviour, and the tighter are the forms of control implemented´.  
 
This proposition is a good starting point for empirical investigations of various hybrid 
governance forms, organized according to their relative degree of transaction specificity 
(synonymous to mutual dependency between the actors involved). But what is the 
nature and basic structure of this dependency? Mpnard distinguishes between two 
generic strategies for developing mutual dependency; (i) complementarities and (ii) 
creation of joint investments. In the former case, each partner develops specific assets, 
and the resulting network of various partners is based on their complementarities. 
Multiple empirical studies have emphasised the importance of durable contractual 
relationships in situations where complementary investments are at stake. In the latter 
case (joint investments), partners decide to pool resources and create joint investments 
as part of their activities. Joint investments are essentially about creating a multiplier 
effect. Mpnard suggests that this kind of hybrid governance is typical of agreements for 
the development and transfer of products among organizations with different minimum 
efficiency scales. The establishment of the cooperative is typically²but not 
necessarily²an effort to overcome the problem associated with small-scale operations; 
i.e. to create a multiplier effect through gaining economies of scale and reducing unit 
costs.  
Furthermore, Mpnard claims that problems arise with both strategies when weakly 
redeployable investments create mutual dependence; i.e. when durable investments 
made by the partners become customized to their mutual needs and presumably loose 
their value outside this application. However, he emphasises one significant difference 
between ³complementarity´ and ³joint investments´: The first one leaves relatively 
open the form that the hybrid arrangement will take. Whether it is organized as a 
contractual arrangement or a form closer to integration, depends essentially on the 
intensity and scope of complementarities in question. On the other hand, joint invest-
ments immediately create significant mutual dependence. It is well established in the 
TCE-literature that this type of lock-in relationship represents a fertile ground for 
opportunistic behaviour. Contracts are normally incomplete, and do not provide 
sufficient safeguards. Therefore, with increasing risk of opportunism, forms of private 
governance arrangements develop for coordinating and policing the relationship. It is 
not unusual to observe that the governance of joint investment is moved away from a 
contract-based agreement and closer to quasi-integration. There are many examples of 
joint investments that are based on this general logic. Mpnard refers to brand name 
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capital as one type, and collective trademarks as another. An abundant literature exists 
on the importance of implementing modes of control among partners to maintain 
reputation. Similarly, the literature on collective trademarks show the importance of 
devices focusing on quality control in order to prevent opportunistic behaviour. The 
reputation of a collective brand based on quality of products or services is typically 
dependent on human assets. Therefore, Mpnard (1996) assumes that training and 
network-specific competencies of partners represent a key factor in the capacity to 
establish and maintain the reputation of the network.5 
 
What about the second driver that is assumed to shape hybrid governance; i.e. the 
degree of uncertainty that surrounds the transactions and activities they intend to 
organize? Interestingly, Mpnard emphasises that uncertainty is secondary to the 
existence of specific investments, since without at least a minimal degree of mutual 
dependence in assets, there would be no hybrid arrangements properly speaking. It`s 
well established in the literature that, once partners get linked through specific assets, 
the role of uncertainty becomes more relevant. The essential argument is that hybrids 
operate as a buffer, with risk sharing as a central motivation. From this basis, Mpnard 
suggests the following generalized proposition when it comes to transactional 
uncertainty:  
³The more consequential the uncertainty is, the higher is the risk of 
opportunism, and hence the more centralized the coordination tends to be´.  
 
Uncertainty can grow out of a hybrid relationship for many reasons; because of features 
of the inputs required, because of the output expected or because of the transformation 
process itself. Uncertainty with inputs is often connected to issues of quality, quality 
control and the risk of free-riding. They can result from non-observabilities on resources 
or services traded among partners; i.e. the fact that qualities and efforts are not easily 
measurable. All these categories of uncertainty appear as highly relevant when it comes 
to the food industry.  
 
So far, we have established why and how specificity and uncertainty are likely to impact 
the specifics of the hybrid governance form. At least partly, this may give a generalised 
answer to why hybrid governance structures exist. But a more detailed description and 
conceptualization is called for. The next question to be addressed by Mpnard is 
therefore whether there are any fundamental similarities²or empirical regularities²
between the various types of hybrid governance. He claims that there are such empirical 
regularities, and that they can be summarised under three subheadings  
(i) pooling resources,  
(ii) competing, and  
(iii) contracting.  
 
We will briefly present each of these factors, and briefly suggest their relevance in a 
further investigation of the agricultural cooperatives in Norway. Obviously, this 
                                                 
 5 One derived question to raise is why firms sometimes prefer to develop and profile separate 
brand profiles for new products that differ somewhat from their ordinary product specter. For 
instance, the meat cooperative Gilde market specialized products under new brand names 
(not Gilde). One explanation may be that this separation reflects differences in the under-
lying brand capital structure. The reputation capital for specialized products must be 
developed and enforced in a different manner than the ³bulk´ products. 
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delimited attempt to apply the theory to this specific context is for illustrative purposes 
only and will only be of an indicative nature.  
Mpnard¶s reasoning with respect to ³pooling resources´ is as follows: ³Whatever the 
form hybrid arrangements take, they are systematically oriented towards organizing 
activities through interfirm coordination and cooperation.´ Therefore, key investment 
decisions must be made jointly by the involved parties. But how come that the 
necessary joint investments are not organized in the form of a market or a hierarchy? 
Following Mpnard, the hybrid appears as a trade-off solution. It exists because²at the 
one side²markets are perceived as unable to adequately bundle the relevant resources 
and capabilities, and²at the other hand²integration in a hierarchy would reduce 
flexibility by creating irreversibility and weakening incentives. In other words, hybrid 
governance combines the best properties of the market and the hierarchy, whereas the 
weaknesses of either forms are overcome.  
Mpnard further assumes that incentives are a driving force in the decision to organize 
transactions under hybrid arrangements, for the good and the worse. On the positive 
side, the incentives to search for rents represent an engine for strategies that require 
pooling of resources, and coordination of decisions.  
On the negative side, sharing rents among the parties involve discretionary choices 
that can easily provoke conflicts and destabilize any agreement. Several implications 
follow, according to Mpnard¶s reasoning:  
First, because pooling resources puts hybrids at risk of opportunistic behavior, 
choosing the ³right´ partners is a key issue. Subsequently, hybrids are often selective 
rather than open systems. The identity of partners matters, whether partnership provides 
complementary resources (thus creating dependencies) or generates a multiplier effect 
(as in the case of collective trademarks).  
Second, hybrids involve joint planning, in diverse forms. Mpnard holds that the 
anticipated complexity of decomposing tasks among partners and of coordinating across 
organizational boundaries is a major factor in the choice of a specific mode of 
governance and in the design of mechanisms for monitoring the arrangements. This 
seems to have strong resemblance to the notion of technical separability. For instance, it 
is clear that the work of a farmer can be technically separated from the work of a 
processing firm. Judged from the perspective of specialization and competency, it is 
advantageous that the farmers can concentrate on his prime business (which is to 
produce unprocessed foodstuffs), whereas the food processor can concentrate on 
refining the raw foodstuffs. This division of separable tasks is commonly referred to as 
³the hierarchical decomposition of tasks´ in the scholarly literature. It illustrates the 
advantages of specialization, but also underlines the necessity of coordination. The 
contractual solution may vary, but the coordination problem in hybrid organizations is 
never ignorable.  
Third, information among parties to an agreement appears as crucial issue. The 
development of an adequate information system among partners is central to the 
survival of hybrids. In many instances, informational asymmetries of various kinds 
represent a major challenge.  
To summarize Mpnard¶s reasoning on this point: Pooling resources among legally 
distinct partners does not make sense without some continuity in their relationship. This 
continuity requires both cooperation and coordination. Partners must accept losing part 
of the autonomy they would have under a market relationship without the benefits of 
extended control that hierarchy could provide. Subsequently, a core problem for hybrid 
organizations can be formulated as follows (Mpnard, 2004a):  
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³How can the involved actors secure cooperation in order to achieve 
coordination at a low cost without losing the advantages of decentralized 
decisions? ´  
 
This problem formulation is a good starting point for an in-depth understanding of the 
dynamics, effectiveness and performance of agricultural cooperatives. Members of a 
cooperative are expected to be concerned about the advantages associated with a 
decentralized decision structure, in the sense that they coordinate without giving up 
their formal autonomy. Members of a cooperative retain their formal position as 
freeholders. Decisions are decentralised in the sense that each freeholder is free to 
determine the volume of raw products that he prefers to sell. The cooperative possesses 
no formal authority rights (³fiat-mechanism´) by which members¶ volume of supplies 
can be determined. This is typically more attractive for the farmers than a situation 
where the receiver (wholesaler, processor, retailer) owns the farm formally (a situation 
commonly referred to as ³backward vertical ownership´). The advantages of the 
freeholder status is consistent to the reasoning of Hansman (1996) and in particular his 
so-called principle of low cost assignment6. This reasoning leads us to the other aspect 
of Mpnard¶s proposition, i.e. the criterion that coordination should be ³secure enough´ 
but nonetheless of a low cost nature. But the intriguing question is how this complex 
criterion of ³high commitments at low cost´ can be fulfilled? It seems reasonable to 
assume that cooperatives tend to strive to fulfil this criterion (more or less successfully, 
it could be added), or at least apply this criterion as an element of their normative basis. 
What is commonly referred to in the cooperative literature is the significance of social 
capital, for instance as materialised in the form of the ³cooperative principles´.7 Ideally, 
all cooperative members should voluntarily adhere to such principles, and thereby 
jointly build up a basis of social capital and mutual trust. Indeed, this enables their 
activities to be coordinated at a low cost. But the real world does not necessarily stand 
up to ideal principles. Also cooperative members may behave opportunistically under 
certain conditions. It takes considerable time to establish a solid basis of social capital in 
an organization. Social capital is of a fragile nature, and can easily be jeopardized. 
Given such limitations due to behaviouristic uncertainty²it is clearly a need for 
safeguarding contractual mechanisms, given that the mutual dependency is unignorable. 
So to re-formulate the problem in Mpnard¶s spirit; how to minimize coordination costs, 
under the condition that the advantages of decentralization are retained appears as a 
highly relevant credo for the study of cooperative organizations. This credo is a sound 
starting point for empirical studies of cooperative organizations as hybrid structures, 
where the interesting research task is to clarify why a particular mix of available 
governance mechanisms are selected at the expense of other combinations. The research 
method here must be of a more inductive (³bottom up´) type, since the aggregated 
knowledge on hybrid governance is yet by far sufficiently developed to formulate 
propositions at the necessary level of detail and specificity.8 But still, the explanation 
should be sought within the nature of the transactional characteristics of the underlying 
activities that need to be organized in some way or other.  
                                                 
 6 Hansman¶s principle of the so-called lowest assignment of ownership, means the 
assignment of ownership that minimizes the total costs of transaction between the firm and 
all of its patrons. 
 7 The principles are developed by ICA (International Cooperative Alliance) and available 
from http://www.ica.coop/. 
 8 We will refer to one such ´bottom-up´-approach later; i.e. the one suggested by Verhaegen 
and Van Huylenbroeck (2002). 
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The next empirical regularity to which Mpnard pays attention is the importance of 
competitive pressures in the shaping of a particular arrangement. The fundamental 
difference in hybrids is that partners remain independent residual claimants with full 
capacity to make autonomous decisions as a last resort. Mpnard holds that the competi-
tive pressure in hybrid organizations operate in two directions: 
 First, partners to a hybrid arrangement compete against each other. This rivalry can 
take many different forms. The arrangement can be designed in a way that 
recurrently makes the partners compete, as for instance in subcontracting where they 
may try to attract customers from the same subset.  
 Second, hybrids usually compete with other arrangements, including other hybrids.  
 
The standard neoclassical explanation of hybrids as pure rent seekers looking primarily 
for market power does not explain much here. Rather, hybrid organizations tend to 
develop in highly competitive markets in which pooling resources are viewed as a way 
to deal with significant uncertainties and to survive (Mpnard, op.cit.).  
This problem is partially dealt with through more or less formal contracts. Contracts 
provide ways of regulating relationships among transactors, creating ³transactional 
reciprocity´. The importance of relational contracting has long been acknowledged 
when cooperation carries advantages as well as risks. Advantages can be expected from 
extended market shares, from transfer of competencies, and from sharing scarce 
resources. But risks are also at stake. Contracts are incomplete and subject to unforesee-
able revisions, since they are about transactions that involve specific assets that are 
often plagued with uncertainties. Part of the difficulty comes from the autonomy of 
partners who remain legally and actually independent in making decisions.  
Mpnard remarks that ´contract´ is often loosely defined so as to include all forms of 
agreement, whether they are explicit or not. To avoid this ³catch-all, catch-nothing´-
problem, he advocates Macneil¶s approach, that contracts are defined as legally binding 
promises. The intriguing question to ask is why legal contracts represent such an 
important safeguard in market economies. Why are contracts so important? His answer 
is²in the TCE-spirit²that contracts are essential because of hazards generated by the 
combination of asset specificity and uncertainty. The hazards may refer to several 
situations, such as (1) bilateral or multilateral dependency, (2) measurement problems, 
(3) changing conditions over time, (4) ill-defined property rights, and (5) weaknesses in 
the institutional environment.  
In a situation where the parties remain legally autonomous but mutually dependent 
for significant decisions, these hazards appear as particularly challenging. Reducing 
them through contracts requires them to design clauses that can efficiently constrain 
opportunism.  
Most studies on hybrids substantiate the crucial importance of adequately selecting 
partners, a process rarely implemented through purely formal rules, e.g. bidding is used 
to test the market, and thereby to discipline partners. Selection is based on past experi-
ence in market relationships, on previous hybrid arrangements, and reputation. To be 
more specific, Mpnard argues that contracts play a crucial role in coordinating partners, 
for the following five reasons:  
1. The decision regarding the number of parties to be included in the arrangement; 
involving a difficult trade-off between bilateral and multilateral agreements. The 
former is easier to monitor, but involve higher dependency. The latter make the 
management of the relationship more complex, but allow comparisons and bench-
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marking, a powerful tool for constraining opportunism. Most hybrids are of the 
second type, and may capture some positive properties of the markets.  
2. Duration also represents an important tool. Contracts in hybrid arrangements are 
either long-term contracts, or short-term contracts automatically renewable. There is 
a close relationship between duration and the intensity of coordination. A 
consequence of this observation is that contracts and contractual relationships are 
two different things, with the former embedded in the latter. Empirical studies have 
documented that contractual relations may last for decades, whereas the underlying 
written contracts may be subject to annual renewals.  
3. Contracts in hybrid arrangements specify requirements. Specifications usually 
concern quantities and, above all, quality standards. When a contract provides only a 
framework, specifications are typically included in detailed annexes.  
4. Adaptation clauses are crucial. 
5. Notwithstanding the richness of these clauses, contracts remain incomplete and 
subject to opportunism. Complementary safeguards are usually needed, which can 
be formal, or based on mutual commitments. 
 
In isolation, none of these characteristics are entirely specific to hybrids. Mpnard 
emphasises that it is their combination that gives hybrids a typical content, in that it 
defines a mode of governance oriented towards solving the fundamental problem of 
interfirm network. As formulated by Mpnard, this problem is as follows:  
³How to economize on the contracting cost necessary to ensure non-
opportunistic behaviour among autonomous partners, as well as on the cost of 
administering a broader range of assets within one single firm. ´  
 
Mpnard further observes that contracts often provide a relatively simple and uniform 
framework for regulation of the interaction between the parties. With contracts reduced 
to a general framework, the choice of a governance structure that can adequately 
complement contracts and contribute to their implementation becomes crucial. Mecha-
nisms must be designed that are aligned with the characteristics of the transactions they 
support, filling blanks that are left out in contracts, monitoring the arrangement, and 
solving problems without repeated renegotiations. The general criteria is as follows:  
How can such governance arrangements secure contracts while minimizing costly or 
even impossible negotiations or re-negotiations.  
 
Finally, Mpnard observes that a striking feature of contracts in hybrid organization is 
their standardization. Contracts are not necessarily tailored to the specific characteristics 
or situation of the partners involved. Uniformity prevails because it economies on 
transaction costs; i.e. on what it would cost to customize and administer many different 
contracts, with the room this would make for opportunism. But as already clarified; if 
contracts provide only a framework, complementary mechanisms are needed for 
monitoring and managing hybrids (Mpnard, op.cit. p. 19). 
To summarize, Mpnard¶s reasoning on the nature of hybrid governance contributes 
significantly to our understanding of this form. From this perspective, the core question 
is as follows:  
What imperfect institutions should govern particular sets of transactions?  
 
Mpnard emphasises the great diversity of agreements among legally autonomous 
entities doing business together, mutually adjusting with little help from the price 
system, and sharing or exchanging technologies, capital, products and services, but 
without a unified ownership. These characteristics are likely the minimum required to 
encapsulate the variety of hybrids.  
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Essentially, hybrid organizations exist because partners need to develop 
coordination, which requires interdependent investments. With ownership remaining 
separate, what matters most for understanding what form of hybrid is chosen is the 
intensity of this interdependence; i.e. the degree of centralization and of formalization 
of the mode of governance required for coordinating and checking partners that are 
legally independent. Three dimensions are assumed to be involved in ant type of hybrid 
governance form:  
 First, the contractual hazards, which results from interdependent investments and 
uncertainty and the provisions to deal with them.  
 Second, the protection and distribution over time of the gains generated by the 
arrangement chosen, and  
 Third, enforcement issues.  
 
In a nutshell version, Mpnard¶s theory is that hybrid arrangements develop when 
specific investments can be dispatched among partners without losing the advantages of 
autonomous decisions, while uncertainties are consequential enough to make pooling an 
advantageous alternative to markets (op.cit., p.160). Mutual dependence of investments 
is particularly significant for understanding the presence of contractual hazards, while 
uncertainty is particularly significant for explaining coordination problems. 
Thus the combination of specific assets and of consequential uncertainties generates 
opportunistic behaviour and miscoordination, which further determines the mode of 
hybrid chosen.  
 
If one attribute only is present, the governance leans towards contract-based 
arrangements. With both attributes together, the governance becomes much more 
authoritarian. Therefore, it is the combination of opportunism, or the risk of opportu-
nism, and of miscoordination, or the risk of miscoordination, that determines the 
governance characterizing hybrid organizations.  
The purpose of the next subchapter is to discuss the relevance and usefulness of 
applying this terminology and mode of theorising as a framework for discussing the 
nature of hybrid governance in the agri-food sector.  
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We have now presented scholarly contributions that address hybrid governance in a 
generic manner. The next question to address is to what extent we find such contractual 
arrangements in the agri-food sector? There are not very many studies that address 
hybrid governance explicitly, but quite a lot that explore the causes and consequence of 
diverse modes of vertical coordination. Given the purpose at hand here, we are 
particularly interested in studies that contribute to the understanding of sources that may 
potentially influence the level of transaction costs. Our focus is both on the causes of, 
the level of, and the consequences of transaction costs in the agri-food system. 
Following the summary in the former chapter, mutual dependencies (transaction 
specificity) and transactional uncertainty are of particular relevance. What types of 
mutual dependencies and uncertainties are most relevant in the agri-food system? And 
what types of governance forms and contractual arrangements seem to follow in this 
system? To explore the latter question, typologies of hybrid governance in the agri-food 
system are of particular relevance.  
 
Vertical relations are a favourite theme among students of the agri-food system, and 
have been subject to increasing theoretical and empirical exploration throughout the last 
decades. There are several definitions that refer to different types of vertical relations, 
differing predominantly with respect to strengths. The strongest form is vertical 
integration, whereas the weakest form is vertical coordination (see Table 3.1). It should 
be mentioned that some authors, e.g. Peterson, Wysocki and Harch (2001), use the term 
³vertical coordination´ as a common denominator for all kinds of cooperation along the 
value chain. Here the term is used as in Str¡m (1998). 
All types are easily found in the agri-food sector. As we will return to later, one 
intriguing task is to explain under what conditions the vertical relations are more or less 
tightly connected and organized 
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Term  Definition  
Vertical integration 
(strongest form)  
All activities in the supply chain from farmer to 
consumer are owned by one party who has residual 
rights (decision rights plus right to residual outcome)  
Vertical control  The activities in the supply chain are owned by different 
parties, but one of the parties possess decision rights 
over all activities in the value chain  
Vertical coordination 
(weakest form)  
The activities at different stages of the value chain are 
owned by different parties, but one or more of them are 
subject to some kind of coordination (beyond prices).  
  
Traditionally, vertical integration has been less explored in the literature than horizontal 
integration. The analytical apparatus provided by neoclassical theory has predominantly 
been applied to the analysis of horizontal market configurations; the strategic play and 
interaction between actors at the same level of the value chain. Focus is predominantly 
on optimization. By virtue of its proved capability to address comparative institutional 
analysis, TCE now appears as the preferred²and commonly accepted²framework for 
the analysis of vertical relations in agri-food. Not very many of them have addressed 
and specified hybrid governance explicitly and detailed, but these studies can never-
theless contribute more generally to our discussion.  
With respect to causes of vertical relations in the agri-food industry, many authors 
have underlined the role of information asymmetry. Hennesy (1996) sets out to explore 
this information asymmetry in more detail. He suggests that three trends are underlying 
this increasing information asymmetry in the food industry; i.e. (1) A movement away 
from undifferentiated agricultural commodities toward more specialized products, (2) 
Reduced reliance on open markets for raw agricultural products, and (3) A movement 
towards agricultural industrialization. The second and third trends are closely related. 
Hennessy suggests that information externalities9, arising from uncertainty concerning 
the nature of the food quality and problems in detecting quality may be reasons why 
vertical coordination is being used to circumvent the marketplace.  
Barkema and Cook (1993) identifies two primary reasons for increased vertical 
integration: (1) The modern consumer is demanding more processed food, and (2) there 
are more demands for more specialized foods such as low-calorie and ethnic foods. 
Traditionally, the market-pricing mechanism has been used to procure these materials. 
However, as argued by Barkema and Cook (op.cit.), market signals have become too 
³fuzzy´ (unclear and unspecified) to guide the grower, whereas production contracts are 
much clearer in specifying the genetics, feeding programs and management programs 
that will provide the homogenous product required to meet the consumersµ tighter 
specifications. These are all perceived of as primary reasons for increased vertical 
integration.  
Similar reasoning is presented by Cook and Iliopoulos (1999). They claim that an 
imperfect ability to detect the required attributes of foodstuffs, together with technology 
advances and a more discriminating consumer are significant problems that could be 
circumvented by greater vertical coordination in these industries. 
Busch (2004) also claims that new forms of contractual relations between suppliers 
and buyers appear to play an increasingly important role in the agri-food sector. One of 
                                                 
 9 An externality is an effect of a decision by one party on another who did not have a choice 
and whose interests were not taken into account.  
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his observations is that large retailer chains tend to prefer direct contracts with growers 
rather than using brokers so as to ensure year-round supplies. The reason why such 
contracts are often quite attractive to growers, is that prices are typically fixed (or within 
an established range) before the growing season begins. Such contracts allow the 
growers to reduce economic risks. Bush observes that farmers are often willing to 
accept lower prices in exchange for greater certainty with respect to income. His 
assumptions is that such farms and firms only enter spot markets when forced to do so 
by virtue of calamities that have struck their suppliers, when demand is unexpectedly 
strong, or when production has exceeded contracted volumes (Busch, op.cit.).  
The background for this development is the fact that agri-food markets appear as 
more and more oligopolistic in nature. Not surprisingly, as the supermarket share of all 
food sales has increased and as the industry has become more oligopolistic, the 
traditional intermediaries between farm and retailer have declined. This is especially 
true for fresh products. Some supermarket chains are now global in scope, which means 
that they are also found in so-called developing countries. Economic concentration in 
the supermarket system is increasing rapidly. One ramification, still according to Busch, 
is that the corporate behaviour of supermarket chains has begun to resemble that of 
other oligopolistic industries: ³Just as the large auto makers watch each other, so do the 
large supermarket chains. Store design, size, product variety and placement in the store, 
and even employee relations are the subject of careful analysis´ (Busch, op.cit. p. 5).  
Interestingly, Busch further observes that, as a natural consequence of economic 
concentration, the role of non-price competition has increased considerably. This is not 
to say that price competition has been eliminated²indeed it remains critical, especially 
in the low-priced segment of the market: ³But overlaid on top of the price competition 
are new forms of competition, each designed to create and maintain customer loyalty´ 
(Busch, op.cit. p. 6). This observation²that non-price competition appears to be 
increasing at the expense of ³conventional´ price competition²appears to be consistent 
with a hybrid governance perspective. A limited focus on prices only is an insufficient 
analytical perspective, since it is unable to take into account the significance of the other 
mechanisms that are in play.  
To summarize, these types of studies confirm that both dependency and uncertainty 
play a significant role as causal factors behind vertical relations in the agri-food sector. 
However, none of the studies mentioned above are very detailed when it comes to the 
more specific design of the governance form. In the next subchapter, we will present 
contributions that invite to a more detailed investigation.  
 
Boehlje (1999) offers a more comprehensive review of governance forms in the agri-
food sector, to a large extent based on Mahoney (1992). Boehlje¶s starting point is an 
observation similar to the contributions mentioned above. The food production and 
distribution industry in the western world is in the midst of major structural change. His 
summary of driving forces includes changes in product characteristics, in worldwide 
production and consumption, in technology, in size of operation, and in geographic 
location. Boehlje holds that the structure of an industry or system is typically dimen-
sioned in terms of size, financial characteristics, resource ownership, technology, and 
similar characteristics. With respect to the agri-food sector, however, he claims that the 
most dramatic changes refer to changes in the way of doing business. In particular, two 
profound changes are occurring in the way in which the agricultural system carries out 
its economic functions: (1) Development of food supply or value chains from genetics 
to end user/consumer, and (2) The adoption of process control technology and a 
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manufacturing mentality throughout the entire food chain, and especially in agriculture. 
Supply and value chains increase the interdependence among the various stages in the 
food chain, using strategic alliances, networks, and other governance structures to 
improve logistics, product flow, and information flow. Competition occurs not in the 
form of individual firms competing within a stage, but in form of supply chains com-
peting for their share of the consumer¶s food expenditures. Biological manufacturing is 
characterized by industrialized production that uses modern business principles and 
manufacturing approaches, including procurement, inventory management, and process 
control technologies and techniques. To summarize, Boehlje claims that  
³agriculture is being transformed from an industry that produces and 
processes commodities to one that manufactures specific attribute products for 
unique end-use markets. ´ 
 
The intriguing question is what governance forms (including contractual arrangements) 
will result in the agri-food sector. In tune with the TCE-credo that governance forms 
must be linked to the transactional nature of the underlying activities they shall 
organize, Boehlje suggests a framework for predicting governance forms. He suggests 
that the governance form will be a function of three characteristics of the transactions 
and the industry: (a) asset specificity, (b) task programmability, and (c) task separa-
bility. These drivers are essentially coherent with the factors presented earlier in this 
working paper, but also bring in some nuances that deserve some further comments. As 
mentioned earlier, asset specificity refers to the specialized nature of the human or 
physical assets that are required to complete the transaction. Task programmability 
indicates that a transaction is well understood by all parties and often repeated, thus not 
requiring intense discussion or negotiations and being easily accomplished by imperso-
nal coordination mechanisms, such as open access markets. This parameter is closely 
related with frequency. Separability refers to the ability to determine and measure the 
value of the contribution and thus the reward that should be given to each participant in 
the transaction. Based on these three parameters, Boehlje than predicts the 
organisational forms presented in Table 3.2. Spot markets are predicted to emerge in a 
situation with low asset specificity and low non-separability, irrespective of program-
mability. The underlying logic is that this type of activities are not very demanding and 
do not imply a particularly high level of transaction costs, so that a relatively simple 
governance structure will suffice. Long-term contracts are predicted with high asset 
specificity, low programmability, and low non-separability. In a situation with high 
asset specificity (mutual dependence), high programmability and high non-separability, 
vertical ownership is expected. The underlying logic is that a relatively ³tight´ 
governance form is necessary in order to organize activities effectively (read: minimize 
transaction costs).  
Low Programmability High Programmability  
Factors Low Asset 
Specificity 
High Asset 
Specificity 
Low Asset 
Specificity 
High Asset 
Specificity 
Low  
non-separability 
1: Spot market 2: Long-term 
contract 
5: Spot market 6: Joint 
venture 
High  
non-separability 
3: Cooperation 
(strategic alliance) 
4: Cooperation 
or vertical 
ownership 
7: Inside 
contract 
(Hybrid) 
8: Vertical 
ownership 
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Mahoney (1992) has developed a framework for predicting governance structure form, 
the underlying dimensions of which are asset specificity and measurement uncertainty. 
His theorising draws predominantly on Transaction Cost Economics, but also to some 
extent on agency theory. The latter perspective comes to the forefront in his emphasis 
on measurement problems related to programmability and separability. In order to 
interpret the classification properly, it is useful to make reference to Mahoney¶s 
definitions of the core concepts. Low task programmability means that observing input 
(read: effort) is a poor measure for making rewards. Likewise, high non-separability 
implies that the observation of output is a poor measure for making rewards. As already 
mentioned, high specificity means that human, physical and/or site firm-specific 
investments are high.  
As can be seen from Table 3.2, this classification encompasses six distinct govern-
ance forms. Spot market (boxes 1 and 5) is coherent with a situation where the output of 
the agent is easily measured (low non-separability) and asset specificity is low. Here, 
the degree of task programmability (i.e. the ease of input measurement) is not 
important. Of course, activities with such characteristics may be organized differently²
i.e. in some type of vertical bindings²but this is not assumed to be neither necessary 
nor useful, according to TCE. In a situation where the output of the agent is easily 
measured (low non-separability) and asset specificity is high (boxes 2 and 6), a long-
term relationship is necessary for the parties to commit to investing in the specific 
assets. In these cases, low non-separability discourages vertical integration. The 
prediction is that high task programmability would be accommodated by a joint venture, 
and low task programmability would be best suited to a long-term contract. When the 
output of the agent is hard to measure (the degree of non-separability is high) and the 
degree of asset specificity is low (boxes 3 and 7), a long-term relationship is required, 
due to the asset specificity. In a situation where the task programmability is low, a 
relational contract that provides incentive for cooperation between the parties is 
required, since output control and behavioural control are both ineffective. If task 
programmability is high, then the ³inside contract´ is predicted to be the optimal 
solution. In this contracting system, agents are paid based on their efforts, and any team 
production within these contracts is monitored by a manager. Finally, when the output 
of the agent is difficult to measure (the degree of non-separability is high) and asset 
specificity is high (boxes 4 and 8), contracting problems are predicted to be severe. If 
the degree of task programmability is low, a hierarchy (i.e. vertical integration) is 
predicted to be the optimal governance form. Under low task programmability (cf. box 
4), this is all together the worst case, since asset specificity is high and both input 
measurement and output measurement are ineffective. In this case, a vertically inte-
grated clan relationship is assumed to be optimal, since a considerable dose of social 
capital is required in order to alleviate opportunistic behaviour.  
This type of classification clearly brings us one step further in our effort to 
understand the relevance and nature of hybrid governance in the agri-food sector. For 
the good and the worse, however, it should be noted that Mahoney¶s classification is 
anchored in a hypothetical-deductive methodology (i.e. in a ³top-down´ approach, so to 
speak). This methodology secures that the propositions are deduced from TCE in a 
logical manner. The propositions appear as empirically testable implications of the 
theory. The weakness is that this methodology does not take the empirical anchorage 
into account. Does this way of conceptualizing give a reasonable and balanced picture 
of the agri-food system, or does it mislead our attention only to certain aspects of it? To 
come to grips with this question, we call for analytical approaches with a stronger 
empirical foundation, one among which is presented in the next subchapter. At the end 
of the day, it is clearly advantageous that our investigation of the new and upcoming 
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contractual formats in the Norwegian agri-food system is based on either 
methodologies. Hopefully, such a combination will provide a more robust and relevant 
analysis.  
 
So far, we have referred to ³top-down´ approaches, which clearly provides important 
insights of the dynamics of governance forms in the agri-food system. However, need 
supplements from studies with a stronger empirical basis in the agri-food system. Such 
an approach must be on level with the actual complexity of most hybrid forms, and help 
to organize empirical observations in a consistent manner. This approach also avenues a 
more inductive methodology; i.e. building theories that are anchored in empirical 
observations. So far, it seems that only one such approach is available; i.e. the one 
presented by Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck (2002), see Table 3.3. 
Their classification makes it possible to analyse different empirical forms from a 
coherent perspective so that interesting similarities and variations can be revealed. Their 
work is of particular interest here because its data are drawn from the agri-food system. 
Their study summarizes data from 156 innovative cases in the Belgian food system. It is 
an attempt to clarify the essence of hybrid organizations by emphasising an array of 
independent variables; i.e. distribution of property rights, coordination of supply and 
demand, function of the authority, decision power of the authority, quality objectives, 
transaction specificity, producers incentive, adaptation mechanism, and nature of the 
contracts. We will comment on each of them briefly:  
(a) With respect to property rights, market governance is characterised by autonomous 
actors having full property rights over assets and products whereas internal governance 
is featured by unified property. In comparison, hybrid governance structures is 
characterised by actors who possess property rights, but have transferred some of these 
rights to their transaction partners.  
(b) Within market governance, supply and demand are coordinated by means of prices; 
i.e. the ³invisible hand´ which contrasts to the ³visible hand´ (the fiat-mechanism) of 
the hierarchy. In comparison, the common feature of the hybrid governance forms is 
that they are characterised by the installation of an authority to which the power is given 
to make a number of decisions. The more precise nature and function of this authority 
mechanism may vary also. All hybrid forms contain an element of authority, but the 
strength and extent/scope of this mechanism may vary substantially between different 
hybrid forms. A loose form of hybrid is to organise a framework or network only. A 
stronger form of authority is to coordinate and make provisions for a certain quality 
level. The decision power of the authority may vary from very weak to very strong.  
(c) The objectives with respect to quality may vary as well. Within an internal 
governance structure, the ambition is commonly to develop and secure a common 
quality level for all involved parties. In a market governance structure, the ambition is 
first and foremost to secure a clearly defined quality level so that buyers and sellers can 
pursue transparent and well-defined transactions.  
(d) Market governance is characterised by non-specific transactions, whereas hierarchy 
is featured by very specific transactions. Here too, hybrid governance is (roughly) 
characterised by some type of intermediate solutions and an intermediate level of 
specificity.  
(e) Market governance is characterised by high incentive-intensity. Producer incentives 
are strong within the framework of a market. At the other end, internal governance is 
typically characterised by a low level of incentive-intensity. 
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(f) The adaptation mechanism is quite autonomous with market governance, whereas 
internal governance is characterised by co-ordinated adaptation. 
Governance structure 
Hybrid 
 
Market 
framework  co-ordinating participating  
Internal 
Property 
rights  
autonomous 
property 
autonomous property with transfer of some 
rights to the authority 
unified 
property 
Coordination 
of supply 
and demand  
invisible hand 
(market) 
invisible hand
(market) 
co-ordination 
by authority 
determination 
by authority 
determination 
by fiat 
Main 
function of 
the authority  
 organising a 
framework  
co-ordinate 
supply and 
demand  
co-ordinate 
and produce 
quality  
 
Decision 
power of the 
authority 
 very limited: 
the 
functioning of 
the 
framework 
limited: 
the 
production 
method, time 
to sell and 
price 
negotiations 
high: 
production 
method and 
planning, 
prices and 
marketing 
 
Quality  
objectives  
basic quality 
(tangible or 
clearly defined 
characteristics)  
individual 
producer 
quality  
unified 
producer 
quality  
unified total 
quality of the 
diverse 
products  
common total 
quality  
Transactions  non-specific  somewhat 
specific  
specific  very specific  very specific  
Producersµ 
incentives  
high  high  high  moderate  low  
Adaptation 
mechanisms  
autonomous  autonomous  autonomous 
& 
coordinated 
co-ordinated  co-ordinated  
Contracts  classical  classical  neo-classical  relational  relational  
 
(g) Last, but not the least, market governance is based on classical contracts, whereas 
internal governance is typically organized in the form of relational contracts. In prin-
ciple, classical contracts presuppose no uncertainty (full certainty). Classical contracts 
can only be applied efficiently in situations where all factors (contingencies) are well 
known/identified, these contracts are complete contracts²³sharp in by clear agreement, 
and sharp out by clear performance´. The parties develop a discrete relation between 
them. The other three contract types²classical long-term contract, internal contract and 
relational contracts are used in situations with uncertainty, but prescribe different 
mechanisms to deal with uncertainty. The classical long-term contract format is 
characterised by an attempt to specify all future contingencies in the contract document 
(the written contract). The internal contract format is based on decision control, rules 
and routines. An actor is granted the authority to take decisions on behalf of another 
party. The parties to an internal contract develop a formal relation. Relational contracts 
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are based on informal mechanisms, like building trust and personal relations. The 
parties to a relational contract develop a norm-based relation. 
Based on an in-depth analysis of these parameters in various empirical settings, 
Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck (2002) distinguish between three typical hybrid 
forms: ³framework´, ³co-ordinating´ and ³participating´, respectively. Of the three, 
³participating hybrid governance´ is closest to internal governance, whereas 
³framework hybrid governance´ is closest to the market.  
 
Finally, our review of the significance of vertical relations in the agri-food industry 
should include a short reference to some of the ramifications of increasingly tighter 
vertical bonds. One implication seems to be of particular interest here, i.e. the fact that 
markets are becoming thinner and the agri-food sector in total may become less 
transparent. Based on his extensive observations of food sectors in many countries, 
Busch (2004) claims that:  
 ³«wholesale markets are more and more what economists call thin markets ± 
markets that handle the residual after most products are sold under contract at 
prices unknown to anyone other than buyer and seller. ´  
 
The consequences of ³thick vertical contracting´ in the agri-food sector clearly needs 
some further investigations. Busch¶ general assumption is that this development reflects 
a fundamental transition of the agri-food sector:  
³Less and less frequently can one make the claim that price summarizes in 
some meaningful way all the relevant attributes of a product. In sum, the market 
has come nearly all full circle to its precapitalist origins´ (Busch, op.cit.).  
  
More specifically, this conclusion is based on the observation that agri-food markets 
have become less transparent as a consequence of the increased degree of vertical inte-
gration. Busch claims that, for a century or more, industrialized nations have collected 
price statistics at various locations on the supply chain, in order to increase the transpa-
rency of the markets, and thereby improve the way markets work in practice. Publicly 
available prices were important in order to ensure that the prices received were assumed 
to be fair by the involved players. Hopefully, the result would be lower prices to final 
consumers. Here, Busch clarifies some aspects of the increased vertical integration in 
the agri-food sector that seems to be underestimated so far:  
³But the widespread use of contracts for many agricultural commodities is 
rapidly undermining those statistics. To the extent that public markets are now 
thin, the prices recorded there are no longer representative of prices received. 
Moreover, they no longer correlate in any consistent way with those prices. In 
some instances, they are essentially useless (even if they may still be plugged into 
equations and used to calculate results). «There is a great irony in this. The 
proponents of free trade have insisted that free trade would result in ± indeed was 
synonymous with ± the creation of a global market economy. But what has begun 
to happen, in part as a result of strategic decisions made by retail food executives, 
is the creation of a global network of largely private relations between buyers and 
suppliers. In that network, where product differentiation is encouraged and 
prized, price still counts, but price is no longer the universal solvent. Less and 
less frequently can one make the claim that price summarizes in some meaningful 
way all the relevant attributes of a product. In sum, the market has come nearly 
all full circle to its precapitalist origins. ´ 
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There are several interesting points that can be drawn from Busch¶ reasoning: 
Conceptually, his observations emphasises the relevance of conceptualizing governance 
of the value chain as a hybrid form: Clearly, incentives in the form of prices still counts, 
but they appear more and more as constitutive elements of largely private relations. 
Interestingly, what Busch refers to as relations of a quasi-feudal nature, is only another 
name for the authority mechanism, the role of which is indisputable in hybrids. An 
interesting empirical question to address is to what extent the Norwegian agri-food 
system is also plagued by this reduced level of transparency. For sure, there are 
indications that the problem is unignorable in this context also. One example is the 
complexity that has been associated with collecting data in empirical studies of the 
marketing margins in the Nordic supply chains (Bergan et al., 2002). 
To pull the threads together, the picture that emerges seems to be one of vertically 
coordinated and oligopolistically oriented supply chains that appear as less and less 
transparent. The retailer chains are clearly in the driver¶s seat in ³their´ respective 
vertical chains. It is not unreasonable to assume that it is first and foremost in their 
interest to decrease the level of transparency, since their room for strategic manoeuvring 
is thereby increased.  
To sum up, it seems clear that issues related to mutual dependency and various types 
of uncertainty are indeed relevant drivers to take into account in the agri-food sector. 
There may be of course be other features of the transactional nature of the underlying 
activities that are underestimated in the literature so far, but the abovementioned factors 
at least represent a relevant point of departure for an empirical exploration of the 
Norwegian agri-food sector.  
To advance the research further, a combination of a ³top-down´ and a ³bottom-up´ 
methodology appears appropriate. In other words, the major assumptions that are 
developed from TCE should be put to a critical test, and a more empirically grounded 
investigation of the case(s) in question should be an essential part of this test.  
In the next chapter, we set out to conduct such a test²in a preliminary version²in 
the case of the Norwegian agri-food sector. The task at hand in this chapter is to apply 
the insights that are referred to up to this stage of the paper as a framework for 
analysing novel contractual arrangements and governance forms in the Norwegian agri-
food system.  
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The purpose of this paper has been to clarify how TCE can enhance our understanding 
of the emerging contractual formats in the Norwegian agri-food system. We have 
constricted the initial question somewhat, since particular emphasis has been laid on the 
conceptualization of hybrid governance. We have concluded that this notion appears as 
a relevant analytical approach, and a well-chosen methodological tool for the analysis of 
the empirical reality of the Norwegian agri-food system. The empirically based 
classification of hybrid governance developed by Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck 
(2002) stands out as a particularly relevant frame of reference for our investigation of 
the changing contracting formats in the Norwegian agri-food system.  
The task at hand in this closing chapter is to develop an answer to the initial question 
that is raised in the title. The discussion throughout the working paper has indicated a 
series of organizational and contractual issues that are highly relevant with respect to 
the future of the Norwegian agri-food system. The time has come to put the many 
pieces together, formulate the most relevant issues more explicitly, and develop their 
ramifications.  
At the outset, it should be underlined once again that TCE is not very well equipped 
to address contextual issues, such as institutional preconditions and factors of a more 
cultural nature. TCE is essentially oriented towards the micro-analytics of organizations 
and contracts, and has less to say about the macro-conditions into which the governance 
structures are embedded. This limitation is obviously important to have in mind as we 
try to sort out TCE¶s relevance for a particular context. To clarify, Williamson (2000) 
has suggested a distinction between four levels of social analysis (Figure 4.1). Level 1 is 
the social embeddedness level where the norms, customs mores, tradition etc. are 
located, and religion plays a large role. Level 2 is referred to as the institutional environ-
ment level. The institutions of governance are located at level 3. Level 4 is about 
resource allocation and employment, the rationale of which is to get the marginal 
conditions in the economy right. Analysis at this level is continuous. At level 3 the 
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frequency is typically from 1 to 10 years, at level 2 the time horizon is from 10 to 100 
years, while at level 1 the frequency may be of a very long-lasting nature; i.e. from a 
hundred to a thousand years. New institutional economics has mainly been concerned 
with levels 2 and 3; economics of property rights and positive political theory at level 2 
and TCE at level 3. According to Williamson, neoclassical economics and agency 
theory are predominantly relevant at Level 4 (Williamson 2000 p. 597).  
 
Level
Level 1:
Social Theory 
Level 2:
Economics of 
property 
Level 3:
Trans.Costs 
Economics 
Level 4:
Neo-classical 
economics/
Agency theory 
Core elements Purpose  
Embeddedness:
Informal institutions, customs, traditions, 
norms, religion 
Institutional environment:
Formal rules of the game ± especially property
(polity, judiciary, bureaucracy) 
Governance: play of the game ± especially 
contract (aligning governance with 
transactions)  
Resource allocation and employment (prices
and quantitities; incentive alignment)  
Often non-
calculative;
spontanous 
Get the institutional 
environment rights: 
1st order
economising  
Get the governance 
structures right; 2nd 
order economising 
Get the marginal
conditions right; 3rd 
order economising  
 
 
Figure 4.1 The Economics of institutions  
 
Our review of the changing contractual arrangements in the Norwegian agri-food 
system will predominantly address the intimate interplay and interdependence between 
the institutional level (level 2) and the governance level (level 3). Said differently, our 
interpretation of contextualization is to explore more explicitly the structure and 
processes by which these levels are related over time, and discuss the consequences. 
Following the vocabulary of Williamson (op.cit.), the scope of the analysis is extended 
to include the interplay between 1st order economizing (³get the institutional 
environment right´) and the 2nd order economizing (³get the governance structures 
right´). In the case of Norwegian agri-food system, it is obvious that the nature of the 
institutional model and the existing governance models have influenced each other in 
the post 2nd World War period. The fact that the agricultural cooperatives have been 
assigned the role as implementor of the nation-wide agricultural politics is presumably 
the most telling example. The successful period of the agricultural cooperatives in 
Norway must be understood in light of the particular institutional preconditions that 
were established in Norway at that time (R¡kholt and Borgen, 1999). Under these 
preconditions, the major players (i.e. the agricultural cooperatives) were offered stable 
³rules of their game´, and they were in position to cultivate their play according to these 
rules. Various sanctions were activated in order to motivate the agricultural cooperatives 
to increase their capability and performance as implementor of the national agricultural 
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policy. (Another aspect is that this rules prevented them from developing capacity to 
play the game to succeed as commercial actors at an integrated, international market.)  
Subsequently, an up-dated understanding of the core institutional preconditions is 
necessary to understand the future dynamics at governance level. What changes in the 
contractual format are likely to come into play in a situation where the institutionally 
conditioned stability of the Norwegian agri-food system is withering? The Norwegian 
agri-food system is in a period of transition, and must adapt to a more internationally 
oriented institutional framework, following Norway¶s obligations as WTO member. The 
intriguing questions are: What type of institutional framework? And how would these 
new ³rules of the game´ impact the governance level of the Norwegian agri-food 
system? These questions are not investigated further here since we set focus on the 
governance level. However, the theme is addressed further in Hegrenes and Borgen 
(2005). This exploration should also add to our understanding of one important driver of 
transaction costs; i.e. exogenous uncertainty associated with the new political reality. 
The exact ramifications of the increased political uncertainty, however, seems far from 
clear as per now.  
The governance level is our primary level of analysis here. Transaction Cost 
Economics²and in particular the cited research on hybrid governance forms²is an 
important source of inspiration. The more specific task is to formulate relevant research 
issues that may illuminate the significance and dynamics of contracts as coordinating 
mechanisms in the Norwegian agri-food system. In other words; what substantial issues 
in the Norwegian agri-food system can TCE contribute to clarify and explain, and in 
what way? We will first comment on the drivers of transaction costs²transactional 
dependency and transactional uncertainty²and thereafter apply the basic TCE-thinking 
to substantial issues that we consider to be particularly relevant in a discussion of future 
contractual arrangements in the Norwegian agri-food system, three of which are:  
 The nature of the vertical relations as it stands today, including the fact that the 
Norwegian agri-food system is now more and more characterised by ³thick contracts 
and thin markets´.  
 The significance of quality development and quality enforcement, including a 
discussion of the significance of various quality signalling mechanisms like branding 
and collective trademarks.  
 New contractual arrangements within the agricultural cooperatives, which appears to 
be mandatory in order to secure improved coherence (match) between changing 
competitive strategies and cooperative structures. The existing mismatch problems 
must be resolved. Future success at the market is conditioned on the cooperatives` 
capability to differentiate both raw materials and value added. The intriguing 
question is: What new contractual arrangements can help to facilitate this necessary 
transition?  
 
What is the nature of the transaction specificity that prevails in the Norwegian agri-food 
system? What type of mutual dependence prevails between the major actors? What are 
the major causes of this dependence? What governance structure follows, and why? 
What are the consequences with respect to efficiency and the relative distribution of 
influence? Here, we will delimit ourselves to a more indicative discussion, with a 
relatively limited empirical anchorage.  
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First, with respect to foodstuffs, there are obvious reasons to take the significance of 
time specificity into account as an important design parameter for governance structure. 
Foodstuffs are typically subject to value decay over time. Timeliness and synchroni-
zation of operations are therefore essential in order to create, secure and maintain the 
expected quality level. Effective logistics and time management are fundamental in 
production and distribution of foodstuffs. In particular, foodstuffs that are subject to 
rapid value decay (milk, meat, some vegetables etc.)²or at least the threat of rapid 
value decay²demand a well synchronized value chain, and presumably also a tight 
governance form that secure a proper and stable quality level over time. As such, this is 
clearly not a new insight. In the 1960s Wilcox and Cochrane (1960) emphasised the 
importance of  
³having control of the time and conditions of delivery, and the quality and 
appearance attributes´.  
 
An intimately related question, which seemed to be less emphasised at that time, is how 
this control and power function is distributed among the involved parties. Who wins, 
who looses? Who is the captain, and in position to²more or less²instruct the activities 
of the chain? Hybrid governance is a conceptual framework that avenues a more explicit 
discussion of these issues also.  
More generally, expensive and advanced technological solutions are called for, for 
instance in the form of ³cold chain technology´ in the case of meat and dairy products. 
Busch (2004) observes that the first refrigerated rail cars permitted a transformation of 
the US beef slaughtering industry. He concludes that it is now technologically possible 
to maintain the cold chain from the point of harvest to the point of consumption on 
hundreds of fresh and frozen products. Low cost fuels combined with large container 
ships and linked rail-ship-truck container movement allow a wide range of new 
products to be found on supermarket shelves at relatively low prices (Busch, op.cit., 
p.8).  
More specific propositions can be developed, for instance taking the different nature 
of food-products into account. Based on an analysis of this driver only²which is of 
course insufficient in an empirically based analysis²it is natural to expect a higher 
level of transaction costs in production and distribution of milk-based products than in 
the production and distribution of more storable vegetables. Following the TCE-logic, 
the governance form is expected to be stricter in the milk-chain than in the vegetable-
chain. Let us underline that such a partial analysis is useful to clarify the underlying 
micro-analytics as seen from a ³top-down´ perspective, whereas a study of real-life 
phenomena should be more grounded in the empirical world. Transaction specificity is 
but one parameter to take into account.  
It is well established in the scholarly literature that foodstuffs of a credence nature 
call for a more complex contractual structure, since prices are assumed to be insufficient 
as conveyors of information (Barkema and Cook, 1993). This problem calls for quality 
signals in the form of private branding, collective trademarks and certification. This 
further calls for governance and contractual forms with a complexity that is coherent 
with the transactional nature of the underlying activities in question. 
One case study of such issues as it unfolds in the Norwegian agri-food system is 
presented in Jervell and Borgen (2004). This study explores three hybrid governance 
forms with the joint intent of securing market access for specialized agri-food products, 
in a situation where the dominating retailer chains are not very eager to bring these 
differentiated products into their shelves and shops. The study applies the typology 
presented by Verhaegen and Van Huylenbroeck in order to organize data and test the 
basic assumption that ³the higher the quality level, the more complex and stricter is the 
governance form´. This assumption was confirmed, which indicates that the basic 
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thinking of TCE can indeed add to our understanding of the evolving contractual 
formats in the Norwegian agri-food system.  
 
TCE claims that if no uncertainty is associated with transactions²meaning that they are 
³sharp in by clear agreement and sharp out by clear performance´²they can be 
effectively organized through market governance. But if transactions are uncertain and 
risky²doubtless a common situation²safeguarding mechanisms and more complex 
governance mechanisms are called for. This insight is well established in organization 
theory. For instance, Thompson (1977) claimed that uncertainty appears as the 
fundamental problem for complex organizations, and that organizations respond to 
environmental uncertainty by ³buffering´ their technical core from its effects. Perceived 
environmental uncertainty exerts a considerable influence on organizational structures 
and processes. But uncertainty is of a ubiquitous nature, and not all sources and types of 
uncertainty are equally relevant. Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) have examined the 
relationship between uncertainty and vertical integration. Based on the prevailing 
literature, they made a distinction between three categories of uncertainty; i.e. primary, 
competitive and supplier-based uncertainty. Primary uncertainty is related to exogenous 
sources; nature, politics and the like. Competitive uncertainty is defined as the 
uncertainty that arises from the actions of potential or actual competitors, which may be 
either ³innocent´ or of a strategic nature. This type of uncertainty derives from moves 
or signals by economic actors in current or future competition with the focal firm, which 
may be ³noisy´ and difficult to grasp precisely. Supplier uncertainty is the behavioural 
uncertainty arising from the (strategic) actions of the exchange partner(s). It refers to the 
risk associated with ex ante or ex post opportunistic behaviour from suppliers. 
Williamson (1975) refers to behavioural uncertainty as ³self-interest seeking with guile´ 
and includes in the concept the use of self-disbelieved statements and misinformation 
with the intention of profiting at the expense of the exchange partner. Sutcliffe and 
Zaheer propose that supplier uncertainty is ³strategic´ and of a behavioural nature. This 
form of uncertainty refers specifically to possible opportunism by either the upstream of 
the downstream exchange partner.  
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Figure 4.2 Sources of uncertainty  
 
Not surprisingly, this source of uncertainty appeared as the most significant driver 
towards vertical integration. Sutcliffe and Zaheer¶s empirical test confirmed that 
supplier uncertainty indeed results in decisions to increase firm scope through vertical 
integration. An intriguing question is whether this holds true in the Norwegian agri-food 
sector also.  
Norwegian agriculture is exposed to multiple sources of uncertainty of a primary 
(exogenous) nature, related to nature and politics, respectively. The ramification for 
contractual arrangements is not necessarily easy to identify, but certainly deserve some 
further reflections. For instance, one unignorable source of primary uncertainty is the 
outcome of the ongoing WTO negotiations. The aggregated consequences for the 
Norwegian agriculture and the food processing industry are investigated by Mittenzwei 
and Nersten (2004). But the further consequences may be diverse and difficult to treat 
systematically and coherently without a final agreement and further specification. The 
overall consequence²which is an intended policy²is that most Norwegian agri-food 
markets are subject to deregulation; i.e. less state and more market. Presumably, this 
implies that agriculture²and the derived food-processing sector²is based more and 
more on genuinely market-based price determination, and less on governmental price 
support and market regulatory schemes. The percent PSE-rate, (PSE=Producer Support 
Estimate) being indisputably high in Norway, is expected to be significantly reduced the 
next years. All branches of the Norwegian agri-food system will be exposed to fiercer 
and more internationally oriented competition, although at differentiated rates.  
It is not straightforward to discern the further consequences of this source of primary, 
exogenous uncertainty for the market structure and governance forms. Nevertheless, one 
interesting question to raise is how power relations may shift as a consequence of 
increased deregulation. According to Busch (2004), there is a general²and even 
global²tendency that deregulation of national and international food systems lead to 
oligopolistic competition between supply chains that are tightly integrated vertically 
from farm to fork. This competition is of an oligopolistic nature since a few large 
players dominate the market. This development pattern seems to hold true for the 
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Norwegian agri-food system also. Another essential characteristics is that the retailer 
chains have taken the leadership role in ³their´ respective chains.  
What these observations boil down to, is that a causal link exists between the 
increased exogenous uncertainty and the shifting power relations in the value chain. For 
decades, the domestic production-distribution chains in the Norwegian agri-food sector 
have been institutionally stabilized. As the market regulatory schemes are removed and 
tariffs reduced, this stabilization is built down also. The consequences are experienced 
particularly directly and explicitly by the agricultural cooperatives, but the ramifications 
are observed at all stages of the value chain. The degree of vertical integration may of 
course vary. At the one extreme is integration via ownership, which is characterised by 
a fiat-mechanism. In that case, the owner (typically a retailer chain) is in position to 
instruct the producers and distributors by virtue of the decision rights that follows from 
the ownership. But there is also other hybrid governance forms in the agri-food system 
that are not coordinated through formal ownership, but tightly integrated through 
various contractual formats (Haugland, 1996; Knutsen et al., 2001).  
The further consequences for the strength of the vertical relations and the associated 
contractual arrangements can hardly be discerned by reference to exogenous uncertainty 
alone. More specific propositions must be developed by reference to other sources of 
uncertainty plus the complete set of the characteristics of the underlying transactional 
characteristics. Let us just indicate briefly what this could mean in the case of the 
Norwegian agri-food system. Uncertainty related to the nature and quality aspects of the 
products (particularly quality aspects) is relevant here. As mentioned above, the 
significance of quality attributes of food-stuffs stems from the fact that foodstuffs are 
typically subject to continuous value loss due to decay. Synchronization problems must 
be solved as efficiently as possible in order to minimize risk for loss of time and thereby 
value decay. In the TCE-vocabulary, this is an issue of solving problems associated with 
time-related specificity.  
Another well-known feature of foodstuffs is their credence nature, which is caused 
by the fact that information is asymmetrically distributed between sellers and buyers. 
For instance, if the seller claims that a particular item is processed in a environmental-
friendly or animal-friendly manner, it is not necessarily easy for the buyer to verify the 
seller¶s claims unless further documentation is brought forward.  
Finally, supplier-based uncertainty, i.e. the risk that the exchange partners in the 
supply chain might behave opportunistically, must be taken into account also in 
empirical studies. 
To summarize, there are multiple sources of uncertainty and much variation to 
account for in empirical studies. Further specification must be grounded in the specific 
characteristics of the products and value chains in question, as well as uncertainty 
associated with the risk of opportunistic behaviour from transaction partners in the 
value chains. In other words, the validity of the expectations that are developed from 
this established body of knowledge must be subject to critical testing based on empirical 
facts. Based on this research programme²and preceding programmes²that explore 
different agricultural sectors, we have at this stage the following case studies to bring 
forth:  
 Hegrenes and Borgen (2003) analysed the potato sector: This study concluded that 
deregulation leads to oligopolistic competition, and the most aggressive one had 
taken the leadership. At least one wholesaler has made relatively strong efforts to 
improve potato quality and to meet consumer demands regarding potato varieties. 
 Knutsen et al. (2001) studied the regionally based production of apples. One 
conclusion was that the fruit producers had few incentives to improve quality above 
the minimum requirements, and to plant varieties that the consumers demand. 
Another conclusion was that the producers were in a ambiguous situation because of 
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both large advantages and disadvantages to become more tightly integrated with the 
retailer/wholesaler chains. On the one hand the producers obtain a relatively secure 
long term outlet for their produce, and on the other hand they might be locked in 
position with decreasing influence and less possibilities to choose alternative 
marketing channels. The conclusions are further elaborated below. 
 Jervell and Borgen (2000) studied the milk sector and the milk quota system: This 
study concluded that quota system had served as a flexible tool for implementing a 
wide set of political objectives and enterprises, within the framework of an advanced 
governance regime. Obvious conflicts of interest between farmers had been negoti-
ated in a structured manner, and softened by the state. There have been unforeseeable 
changes in the rules, regulations and administrative practices. One reason why this 
has been accepted, is the way the quota system is embedded in the agricultural policy 
process. 
 
In the scholarly literature, the significance of transactional frequency as a driver of 
transaction costs seems to be more contested than specificity, mutual dependence and 
uncertainty. The significance of frequency will not be discussed in detail. With respect 
to the Norwegian agri-food sector, we delimit our exposition to one aspect of trans-
action frequency, notwithstanding the fact that this problem is not the standard one that 
is normally described in the TCE-literature. Since the theme appears to be of particular 
relevance for the Norwegian agri-food sector, however, it deserves some special 
attention here.  
Approximately 98% of the volume is traded through the four dominating actors that 
compete very much in the manner that standard textbook expects oligopolistic competi-
tors to do. As seen from the perspective of the suppliers, the struggle is to gain access to 
one or more of the chains; i.e. to become an insider. On the other hand, it is not 
necessarily unproblematic to be an insider. Smaller producers may find themselves in a 
vulnerable and risky contractual position (Knutsen et al. 2001). The ³chain captain´²a 
role played by the retailers²is in position to instruct suppliers, and more or less ³force´ 
the suppliers into his conceptual thinking and adapt to sales concepts that is not 
necessarily optimal for the supplier in the long run. Knutsen et al. (op.cit.) refer to one 
example where the supplier are ³forced´ to strip out all types of potential differentiation 
features in order to cultivate the cost-leadership profile that the retailer chain want to be 
associated with. In other words, the chains parties¶ interests don¶t necessarily coincide. 
What is good for the sales curves of the retailers and distributors is not necessarily good 
for the product development and business development of the suppliers.  
Said differently, some suppliers are selected to become frequent suppliers and conse-
quently enter into a process of transactional specificity. An appropriate contractual 
scheme is developed that regulates fundamental issues like quality level and transaction 
frequency. The selected suppliers²normally not very many²become insiders. As 
already mentioned, some insiders have experienced a dose of ambiguity here, since the 
frequent deliveries to one main customer increase their dependency. They run a 
substantial risk for being exposed to ³Hold-up´ situations. They are forced to be loyal to 
the sales concepts of the retailers, which are not necessarily in their strategic interest 
over time. Example: ³Apples from Hardanger´ is sold under a hard-discount concept, 
due to lack of other market outlets. In the terminology suggested by Levinthal and 
March (1993), an imbalance emerges between exploitation and exploration (Knutsen et 
al., 2001). Heide and John (1988) have emphasised the need for offsetting activities for 
small producers in such a vulnerable contractual situation. Nevertheless, these producers 
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are²more or less²integrated in a system that can somewhat loosely be coined ³thick 
vertical contracts´.  
Then, what about the outsiders? In the current Norwegian agri-food system, a very 
small proportion of the traded volume is now sold outside the four vertically integrated 
chains. The situation resembles what is normally called a thin market, with relatively 
few buyers and sellers. In short, they operate on increasingly thinner markets, and fight 
for access to established market outlets, and/or the establishment of alternative outlets 
(Jervell and Borgen, 2004).  
Much more can be said about the strategic position of the ³outsiders´ also, but we 
will here instead pay attention to one important consequence of this particular market 
configuration (³thick contracts and thin markets´); i.e. the diminished degree of 
transparency with respect to prices and other vital economic information. In a study of 
³joint marketing´ in the distribution of foodstuffs in Norway, Dulsrud (2005) has 
documented that suppliers pay a shelf fee in order to secure access to the retailer chains. 
Evidence of a more anecdotal nature is easy to find too. For instance, NILF has under-
taken multiple studies of prices, marketing margins and price transmissions through 
supply chains in the Norwegian agri-food sector. The methodological challenge has 
been to get access to necessary data from the processors and distributors in question. To 
reveal information has emerged more and more as a threat to their competitive strategy.  
More generally, Busch (2004) has emphasized that this situation is increasingly 
blurring the balance between private and public price information. Zawada (2002 p. 8) 
has concluded that a situation with ³thick contracts and thin markets´ impact the 
parties¶ relative capability to control vital information, and thereby their relative power 
situation: 
³The changing character of agriculture, including the increased use of 
agricultural production contracts, has the effect of reducing the transparency of 
the process. The concern this raises is that the market system will be subverted in 
favour of those who control information, harming those without access to the 
data. 
A system based on agricultural production contracts is more closed than the 
traditional markets. A sophisticated system has arisen for commodities such as 
grain, with grading provisions, traders and futures and other derivatives. An 
important part of this system is open pricing«The goal is to have a perfect 
market, without advantage given to those with inside information on prices.  
Agricultural contracts work against this. Since prices are contained in an 
agreement that is privy only to (usually) two parties, there is an inherent 
restriction on price discovery. Unless one side or the other overtly publishes the 
details to the world, it is usually the case that only friends or family can learn 
pricing specifics. 
« 
«Confidentiality clauses also can have an impact on bargaining position.´ 
 
 To sum up, producers seem to be exposed to an on-off situation; i.e. to be accepted as 
supplier to one of the four retailer chains, or not. Insiders are in position to benefit from 
frequent transactions, which is reflected in the contractual format. But being an insider 
has a cost. The contractual set-up within a specific supply chain reflects the uneven 
market power between suppliers and buyers. A common situation is that the suppliers 
must adhere to the sales concepts of the retailers. The strategic problem is very different 
for those suppliers that do not succeed in getting access to one or more of the chains. 
Being an outsider, their problem is to establish an outlet that secures some degree of 
frequency at all. Outsiders must act in increasingly thinner markets. Information about 
prices and other fundamental economic issues appears to be more and more ³privatized´ 
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by the oligopolists. The further consequences for actors and the Norwegian agri-food 
sector in general deserve further investigation.   
 
As already indicated, TCE can add to our understanding of several aspects of quality 
development and quality enforcement in the Norwegian food system. What TCE 
inspires us to explore, is the causal link between the transactional nature of the activities 
in question, and the governance structure. One derived assumption is that the higher the 
quality level, the stricter and more complex is the governance form. Another prediction 
is that simple transactions (³sharp in and sharp out´) can do well with a simple govern-
ance structure, such as a spot contract. However, such transactional characteristics are 
not typical in the case of foodstuffs, as already mentioned. Prices appear as necessary 
but insufficient as coordinating mechanisms, due to information asymmetry, the 
credence nature of the products and likewise problems. Subsequently, more complex 
governance is called for, in the form of company-specific branding, third party 
certification or a combination.  
More demanding food safety-regulations²including quality assurance systems and 
traceability systems²also challenge the players¶ capability to document properties and 
quality level in a manner that far exceed the insufficient quality indications offered 
through relative prices. More generally, Carriquiry, Babcock and Carbone (2003) 
identify three incentives for growers and food manufacturers to adopt quality assurance 
systems (QASs): (a) increased consumer demand for knowledge about where food come 
from and how it was produced; (b) opportunities for producer groups to capture a 
greater share of the consumer dollar by differentiating their products; and (c) greater 
protection for food manufacturers and retailers against food safety liability. What 
constitutes a proper mix of public and private efforts in setting QASs is an unsettled 
question. Carriquiry et al. (2003) model the optimal degree of ³stringency´ or assurance 
in a processor¶s quality control system over procurement of agricultural output when 
there exists uncertainty about quality. The model predicts that the degree of stringency 
depends on (a) whether the sought-after attribute is discoverable by consumers, (b) the 
price premium paid for the attribute, (c) the cost of quality control, and (d) the damage 
caused by false certification. Contractual formats that reflect this situation develop. For 
instance, a normal situation is now that contracts are of a very general, relational type 
(serve as a framework), and that a further reference to quality standard(s) is fundamental 
for the more specific content.  
Clearly, quality enforcement appears as an important substantial issue to study in the 
light of new contractual arrangements in the Norwegian agri-food sector. Particular 
emphasis should be laid on quality standards in the form of private branding and 
collective trademarks and certification. The former is enforced by the company itself 
(³self-enforcement´) whereas the latter is enforced through third party certification and 
guarantees. It is not unusual to find combinations of the two in the Norwegian agri-food 
sector (Norberg and Myrland, 2003). Collective trademarks are of particular interest 
here. According to Mpnard (op.cit.), the goal of collective trademarks²and their 
supportive mode of organizations²is to reduce customers` search costs while 
benefiting from joint marketing. Collective trademarks usually involve backward 
coordination and often originate from suppliers, although retailers may also take the 
initiative. The larger the number of partners involved, the higher is the risk of 
opportunism. Large number of partners also implies that monitoring and control become 
more demanding. The intriguing question to raise is how effective such trademarks 
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work as quality signalling mechanisms, and what governance mechanisms is required in 
order to secure that the expected quality level is delivered over time. Jervell and Borgen 
(2004), in a study of Farmers Markets in Norway, predict that tighter quality control²
and perhaps also stricter selection of members²might be necessary to secure the 
promised/necessary quality level over time.  
This theme deserves further attention, both in order to provide the involved actors 
with relevant guidance for their development of quality standards, but also in order to 
add to our more theoretically oriented understanding of hybrid governance. 
 
As long as the members of a cooperative produce a homogenous raw product and the 
processed product has a low degree of differentiation (that is, it has almost perfect 
substitutes), there is little need for specific contracts with the members. This may still 
hold if the cooperative chooses to use the standard raw product as input for a differenti-
ated final product. The membership ³contract´ is sufficient to give the producers correct 
incentives. However, if the cooperative decides to diversify the final product by using a 
diversified input, there may be a need for contracts with the producers specifying 
quantity, quality, and price of their production. 
The cooperative form exemplifies fundamental characteristics of hybrid governance 
(Mpnard, 2004; Iliopoulos, 2003) in the sense that the three empirical regularities 
suggested by Mpnard²pooling resources, competition and contracting²are indeed in 
place in cooperatives. The more fundamental challenges for the cooperative are among 
others:  
 How can the cooperative secure cooperation between its patrons in order to achieve 
coordination at a low cost without losing the advantage of decentralized decisions? 
 How can the governance structure of the cooperative secure contracts while 
minimizing costly (re)negotiations? 
 
Mpnard (op.cit.) points out that cooperatives share some characteristics with both 
collective trademarks and partnerships in the sense that they all confront problems of 
control over quality in order to avoid negative externalities.  
Agricultural cooperatives play a fundamental role in the Norwegian agri-food sector. 
They are now in a period of rapid transition. New competitive strategies demands 
differentiation of inputs (raw material) as well as differentiation of value added products 
(S¡rensen, 2005). The contracts must stimulate members to differentiate their products, 
for instance organically produced raw materials vs. conventionally produced products. 
We expect to observe a development from general constitutional contracts to more 
specific contracts which imply more risk-taking on the hands of the farmers, changed 
incentive-intensiveness etc.  
The relevant themes that are raised in this chapter, are summarized below:  
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THEME  Illuminated in the 
following case-
study  
Message to be drawn from this study 
Deregulation and 
increased 
oligopolistic 
competition  
Hegrenes and 
Borgen (2003) 
Less regulation at the same time as 
concentration of retailer/wholesaler chains, and 
a much weakened horticultural marketing 
cooperative led to tight and dedicated vertically 
coordinated chains. There is still a target price 
system for potatoes and a few other vegetables. 
Import tariffs are important. The wholesalers 
are very central in quality definition and 
enforcement, packing, and in marketing. 
Producers in a relatively weak position. 
Quality 
development and 
enforcement  
Jervell and Borgen
(2004) 
Many parallel trends in quality developments 
and enforcement: Some qualities are defined by 
the government (organic farming), some are 
defined by voluntary quality systems, some by 
the retail chains, some in close cooperation 
between actors at various stages. 
Restructuring of 
agricultural coops  
S¡rensen (2005) Merging of regional cooperatives into nation 
wide concerns. More differentiation of products 
according to quality. Some of the qualities that 
consumers demand, originate at farm level; 
there is a differentiation of raw products and 
producers. The agricultural cooperatives try to 
develop quality and pricing system that gives 
the right incentives to producers and to organise 
the business activity in a way that reflects the 
value added of the differentiated products and 
the associated risk. The general membership 
contract is not enough, and various forms of 
additional contracts between cooperatives and 
specialty producers are expected to develop.  
Emerging of 
specialised 
products and new 
market channels 
Jervell and Borgen 
(2004) 
Some farmers try to develop new market 
channels for various reasons, e.g. to reap a 
greater part of the consumer price, and to find 
outlets for specialised products that do not fit 
into the various retail store concepts. Farmers 
form framework organisations as the Farmers 
Markets to market such product. In Norway the 
Farmers Markets are sponsored by the 
agricultural marketing cooperatives.  
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In conclusion, our review have hopefully convinced the readers that TCE can indeed 
add to our understanding of new contractual formats in the Norwegian agri-food system, 
and serve as an organizing framework for such investigations. But it is also clear that 
TCE needs to be carefully contextualized, and its blind spots should be kept in mind. 
The theory should not be stretched too much. For instance, TCE has nothing too say 
about phenomena at a macro-level, such as the changing political-institutional frame-
work. With respect to the Norwegian agri-food system, it is clear enough that the funda-
mental drivers behind new governance structures and contractual formats are very much 
associated with factors that are exogenous to contractual partners in the value chain; not 
the least new political ideologies, which are read off in form of more liberalised 
international trade in foodstuffs, and deregulation of the national food system. Equally 
obvious, however, these overall changes imply that new sources of uncertainty increase 
and the general level of uncertainty is enhanced for all involved players in the 
Norwegian agri-food system. TCE can first and foremost add to our understanding of 
the manner by which this increasing uncertainty is dealt with by the producers and 
distributors in the system. This requires an in-depth understanding of the transactional 
nature of the underlying sets of activities. The theory helps us to analyse the basic 
conditions under which new contractual formats²or governance forms in general²are 
evolving. This is consistent with the standard distinction between the two levels of 
analysis²rules of the game (analysis of institutions) and how the players play the 
game, given these rules (governance). TCE helps to understand the latter, but pre-
supposes a relevant understanding of the former. Subsequently, a multilevel approach is 
necessary in order to capture the nature of the new contractual arrangements that are 
evolving in the Norwegian agri-food supply chains. Indeed, an unignorable part of the 
contractual issues between a farmer and a consignee in Norwegian agriculture has 
traditionally been determined by public law and regulation and/or by a cooperative 
membership. Subsequently, our analysis must include and embed factors at the 
³institutional level´ such as public regulations, contract law and norms. They all heavily 
impact the contractual situation of the individual farmer. Indeed, some observers would 
claim that the Norwegian agriculture is regulated in such a detail that there is almost 
nothing left to be filled into ³normal´ bilateral contracts between a seller and a buyer. 
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On the other hand, Norwegian food-producers²and the agri-food system as such²are 
gradually entering a new era. The institutional context is expected to change dramati-
cally the coming years²from a relatively closed and protected national system to a 
situation characterised by much more international competition. The ramifications are 
many and diverse. Here, it should suffice to say that in order to come to grips with the 
ongoing changes, an analysis is required of both the institutional framework level and 
the governance level.  
Finally, it should also be briefly mentioned that TCE is clearly subject to continuous 
development and refinement. Just to mention one promising example: In an effort to 
overcome the problems related to different levels of analysis which is addressed above, 
Jacobides and Winter (2003) has suggested that a more evolutionary version of TCE is 
needed. Implicitly, a more advanced understanding of the dynamic interplay between 
individual actors and the social structure is called for also. The efforts to develop such 
an improved understanding have begun, but it is too early in the process to verify its 
usefulness.  
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